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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over Petitioner's appeal from a final action or order of
the Salt Lake City Employee Appeals Board ("the Board") pursuant to Utah Code Ann,
§ 10-3-1106(6) (2007).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
In responding to the brief of the Appellant, Appellee Salt Lake City ("the City")
presents the following issues for review by this Court:
I.

Whether Ms. Howick has the right to appeal her termination to the Board,

including whether she is estopped from denying the validity of the contract she entered
into with the City wherein she agreed to become an at-will employee in exchange for a
substantial increase in pay, and the related issue of whether she waived her right to
challenge her allegedly illegal at-will employment status because she accepted the
benefits of the contract for nine years. The standard of appellate review of this issue is
abuse of discretion. Allen v. Dept. of Workforce Services, 2005 UT App 186, \6, 112
P.3d 1238, 1241; Morton Int'h Inc. v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n,
814 P.2d 581, 588 (Utah 1991).
The issues of Ms. Howick's right to appeal, estoppel, and waiver were preserved
below.

Ms. Howick's right to appeal her termination to the Board was examined

throughout the proceedings below, and the Board determined that Ms. Ptowick did not
have the right to appeal her termination because she was an at-will employee. R. 73.
Additionally, the City's waiver and estoppel arguments should be considered by this
Court because, "[a]s the rule states, an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed

4826-7992-7811.3
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from 'if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record.'" Bailey
v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58,1(13, 52 P.3d 1158 (quoting Dipoma v. McPhie. 2001 UT 61,1(18,
29. P.3d 1225).
II.

Whether Ms. Howick's agreement with the City, even assuming it is void,

may be enforced because a balance of the equities favors enforcing the contract. The
standard of appellate review of this issue is abuse of discretion. Allen, 2005 UT App 186
at ^[6; Morton, 814 P.2d at 588. The issue of the validity of Ms. Howick's agreement
with the City was preserved because it was raised by Ms. Howick in proceedings below.
R. 109.
III.

Whether this Court has jurisdiction to consider the constitutional due

process arguments raised by Ms. Howick, whether Ms. Howick had a "property interest"
in her employment with the City, and whether Ms. Howick received due process in the
Board's proceedings related to her appeal. The standard of appellate review of this issue
i

is abuse of discretion. Allen, 2005 UT App 186 at TJ6; Morton, 814 P.2d at 588.
IV.

Whether Ms. Howick is entitled to the attorney fees and costs for bringing

this appeal where the rule is that, absent exceptional circumstances, fees and costs are
only awarded if they are authorized pursuant to statute or contract. The standard of
review of this issue is de novo. Culbertson v. Bd. of County Commissioners of Salt Lake
County, 2008 UT App 22, f7, 177 P.3d 621. This issue was not raised below.
LAWS TO BE INTERPRETED
The following are constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules and
regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to

4826-7992-78113
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the appeal.

The foil text of the following citations is set forth in Appendix 1 of

Appellee's Brief.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 (2007).
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 (2007).
Utah Constitution Article I, § 7.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is an appeal from a final agency action of the Salt Lake Ci1y Employee
Appeals Board, wherein the Board determined that Ms, Howick was an at-will employee
and did not have the right to an appeal.
Ms. Howick was hired as a city attorney in 1992, and in 1998 she agreed to
become an at-will employee in exchange for a substantial increase in salary and benefits.
Ms. Howick's employment was terminated in 2007. The month after she was discharged,
Ms. Howick submitted a Notice of Appeal to the Board. The City's Labor Relations
Officer determined that the Board could not hear Ms. Howick's appeal because she was
an at-will employee, and sent Ms. Howick5s counsel a letter explaining this position. Ms.
Howick appealed to this Court, and this Court dismissed the appeal on the ground it
lacked jurisdiction because there had been no final action of the Board. The Court,
however, suggested that the City's Labor Relations Officer could not issue final decisions
of the Board.
The City then forwarded Ms. Howick's appeal to the Board.

The Board

determined that there was a question about whether Ms. Howick could make an appeal to
the Board given that she was an at-will employee. After receiving briefing on the issue
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from both sides, the Board decided to request a legal opinion on whether Ms. Howick's
at-will status was legal. The legal opinion was initially sought from the City Attorney,
but the City Attorney determined that he had a conflict of interest because he was the
person who had terminated Ms. Howick.

The City Attorney referred the Board's

question to independent outside counsel to provide an opinion on the validity of Ms.
Howick's at-will status. Independent counsel concluded that Ms. Howick had lawfully
waived her statutory rights and became an at-will employee in 1998. The Board voted
unanimously that it could not consider Ms. Howick's appeal because she was an at-will
employee. The Board's decision constituted a final action, which Ms. Howick then
appealed to this Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

In 1992, the City hired Ms. Howick as an attorney. R. 83.

2.

On July 22, 1998, Ms. Howick voluntarily agreed to become an at-will

employee in exchange for a substantial increase in her compensation and benefits. R. 27,
83-85. Ms. Howick signed an "At-Will Employment Disclaimer," attached hereto as
App'x 3, that states:
I understand that, if I am appointed by the Salt Lake City
Attorney to the "Appointed Senior City Attorney" position,
my employment will be at-will and will be for no fixed length
of time.
I understand that no oral or written statements (in personnel
manuals, policies, procedures, or elsewhere) or any conduct
of the Mayor, City Attorney, or other City official at any
time, other than in a written contract of employment signed
by the Mayor or City Attorney, can create an express or
implied contract to the contrary.

4826-7992-7811 3
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R. 63; App'x 3. Ms. Howick's decision was voluntary, and not all city attorneys who had
the option of becoming at-will in exchange for increased salary chose to do so. R. 48.
3.

Ms. Howick remained an at-will employee for more than nine years. She

was discharged on August 31, 2007.l R. 83.
4.

On September 10, 2007, Ms. Howick submitted a Notice of Appeal to the

Employees Appeals Board (the "Board"). R. 108. While acknowledging that she was an
at-will employee, Ms. Howick argued that her at-will status was unlawful. R, 109.
5.

On September 21, 2007, the City's Labor Relations Officer wrote to Ms.

Howick's counsel, explaining that because Ms. Howick was an at-will employee, she did
not have the right to appeal her termination. R. 35.
6.

The Employee Appeals and Grievance Policy and the Board Procedures

both state that at-will employees are not entitled to an appeal to the Board. R. 37, 40.
7.

On October 22, 2007 Ms. Howick filed a Notice of Appeal with this Court

under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(6) (2007), which provides for an appeal from a final
action or order of an appeal board.
8.

This Court dismissed Ms. Howick's appeal because there had been no final

action or order of the Board. Howick v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2008 UT App 216, 2008
UT App. LEXIS 212 at *2. This Court also suggested that the City's Labor Relations

Ms. Howick claims that she was discharged without notice or explanation. Br. of
Appellant at 5-6. Ms. Howick's assertion is incorrect because the City Attorney met
twice with her regarding her conduct and the reasons for her discharge. Additionally,
Ms. Howick's assertions about the circumstances of her discharge are not based on facts
in the administrative record and are irrelevant to her appeal.
4826-7992-7811.3

5

Officer could not issue final decisions regarding the Board's jurisdiction. See id. 2008
UT App. LEXIS at *3 n.l. The City then determined that Ms. Howick could submit an
appeal to the Board, and the Board would determine whether Ms. Howick's appeal was
proper.
9.

On June 20, 2008 the Board received Ms. Howick's appeal. The Board

recognized that there was a question as to whether Ms. Howick Tiad the right to appeal
her discharge given her at-will status, and the Board invited Ms. Howick and the City to
submit their respective positions on the issue in writing. R. 104. Both Ms. Howick and
the City did so, and Ms. Howick fully briefed the issues in an extensive memorandum.
R. 27-46, 47-68.
10.

The Board met on June 26, 2008 to consider Ms. Howick's appeal. R. 8.

The members of the Board noted that Ms. Howick had agreed in writing to be at-will and
had remained an at-will employee for nine years. R. 18, 22. After considering Ms.
Howick's argument that her at-will employment was not lawful, the Board decided to
request a legal opinion from the City Attorney on whether Ms. Howick's at-will status
was legally proper. R. 15-17, 19-20,23-24. The Board's request for a legal opinion from
the City Attorney is required when the Board has "a question whether a City employee is
within the class of persons who may appeal a discharge . . . ." Employee Appeals Board
Procedures ("Procedures") § III.G, attached hereto as App'x 2.
11.

On July 1, 2008 the Board requested a legal opinion from the City Attorney

on the lawfulness of Ms. Howick's becoming an at-will employee in 1998. R. 96.

4826-7992-78113
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12.

The City Attorney wrote back to the Board, explaining that he had a

conflict of interest because he had made the decision to terminate Ms, Howick's
employment. R. 94. The City Attorney further explained that, pursuant to Salt Lake City
Code Section 2.08.040A(3), he was referring the Board's question to independent outside
legal counsel, who would be "in no way subject to the control or direction of the city
attorney." Id.
13.

The City Attorney wrote to attorney Stanley Preston at Snow Christensen &

Martineau, requesting that he serve as "independent special counsel" for the purpose of
responding to the question raised by the Board. Letter at R. 131-32 and attached hereto as
App'x 4. The City Attorney emphasized to Mr. Preston that he would "not be subject to
the control or direction of the city attorney." LI The City Attorney explained to Mr.
Preston the Board's question as well as the parties' respective positions on the issue. He
also provided to Mr. Preston copies of the memoranda that had been submitted to the
Board by the parties' counsel. Id
14.

On July 2, 2008, Mr. Preston accepted the assignment to serve as

independent special counsel to the Board. R. 90.
15.

On July 10, 2008, Mr. Preston provided his legal opinion to the Board.

R. 81-87. Mr. Preston concluded that Ms. Ho wick had waived her statutory rights and
voluntarily become an at-will employee in July 1998. Preston Opinion at R. 85-87 and
attached hereto as App'x 5.
16.

Mr. Preston limited his opinion "solely to Ms. Howick's situation," and did

not address the legality of any City policy or procedure. R. 87. He noted that Ms.

4826-7992-78113
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Howick's argument against her at-will status focused "only on the state statute" and
"ignore[d] that she voluntarily signed the Disclaimer." R. 85. Because the statutes in
question (§ 10-3-1105; § 10-3-1106) do not expressly prohibit an employee from waiving
his/her statutory rights, unlike other Utah statutes dealing with workers' rights, and
because Ms. Howick voluntarily agreed to become an at-will employee "in exchange for
an increase in pay, which she subsequently received," Mr. Preston concluded that Ms.
Howick had lawfully waived her statutory rights and properly became an at-will
employee in 1998. R. 85-86 and App'x 5.
17.

Mr. Preston summarized his opinion as follows:
[W]e conclude that the "conversion" of Ms. Howick's
position to an at-will position in July 1998 was effected in
accordance with the lawful prerogatives of the parties. Ms.
Howick, a lawyer, voluntarily signed the Disclaimer wherein
she agreed to be an at-will Senior Staff Attorney in exchange
for an increase in pay. She remained in that position for ten
years until her termination in 2007. There is nothing in Utah
Code Ann. § 10-3-1105, § 10-3-1106, or in any other law,
which prohibits a municipality's requesting an individual's
waiving statutory due process rights by voluntarily agreeing
to become an at-will employee pursuant to an agreement
supported by consideration.

R. 87 and App'x 5.
18.

On July 15, 2008 the Board met and considered the legal opinion it had

received from Mr. Preston. Decision of Board at R. 73 and attached hereto as App'x 6.
The Board "voted unanimously that it did not have the authority to review the appeal of

The Board met in a closed session (R. 73) as required by its Procedures, § VII.G,
attached hereto as App'x 2 ("[TJhe Board shall meet in a . . . closed meeting to deliberate
and reach a decision.").
4826-7992-78113
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Ms. Howick." Id. It based its decision on three factors: (1) Ms. Howick was an at-will
employee at the time of her termination, (2) she had properly become an at at-will
employee in 1998, and (3) under the City's policies and procedures, the appeal process to
the Board did not apply to at-will employees. Id
19.

The Board informed Ms. Howick of its decision on the same day. R. 73.

20.

On July 18, 2008 Ms. Howick filed a Notice of Appeal/Petition for Review

with this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106.
21.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(6) provides in relevant part:
(1) "A final action or order of the appeal board may be
appealed to the Court of Appeals ...";
(2) "The Court of Appeals' review shall be on the record of
the appeal board ..."; and
(3) "The Court of Appeals' review shall be . . . for the
purpose of determining if the appeal board abused its
discretion or exceeded its authority."

Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(6)(a), (c).
22.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 does not provide a standard (or a set of

permitted grounds) for a proper discharge of a covered employee, 4?ut only an appeal
process to be followed in the case of a discharge of a covered employee. Compare Utah
Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(1) through (6) with Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012(1), which
applies to a different category of public employees.

3

See infra fn 12.

4826-7992-78113
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23.

Sections 10-3-1105(3) and 10-3-1106(7) provide that the reasons for

discharging employees and "the procedure for conducting an appeal and the standard of
review" to be used by an appeal board are left to the municipality.4
24.

In 2004 the Utah legislature amended Utah Code. Ann. § 10-3-1105 and

§ 10-3-1106. Among the changes, the 2004 amendments specified the procedures for
appealing a board's decision to the Utah Court of Appeals and the abuse of discretion
standard of review to be applied by the Court of Appeals. The 2004 amendments also
declared that they may not be "construed to limit" a city's ability to determine reasons for
discharging an employee, and delegated to municipalities the authority to decide "the
procedure for conducting an appeal and the standard of review to be used by
administrative appeal boards." Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105(3); § 10-3-1106(7)(a); First
Substitute S.B. 23, available at http://www.le.state.ut.us/-2004/bills/sbillint/sb0023s01.
pdf; Joint Conf. Committee Report, 2/16/04, available at http://www.le.state.ut.us/
%7E2004/comreport/SB023C10. pdf.
25.

Representative David Ure, the sponsor of the bill ("First Substitute Senate

Bill 23") that became the 2004 amendments to § 10-3-1105 and § 10-3-1106, explained

The Board applies a deferential, abuse of discretion standard of review when
considering an appeal from the discipline or discharge of a covered employee. If the
department head's decision regarding an employee is supported by "plausible" reasons,
"the decision should be upheld, even though the Board may have weighed the evidence
differently had it been in the department head's position." "Unless the Board finds the
[action] to constitute an abuse, rather than an exercise of the department head's
discretion, the decision of the department head should be upheld." Procedures § VILG.l
and 2, attached hereto as App'x 2.
4826-7992-78113
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the purpose of the bill on the floor of the House of Representatives on February 11, 2004
as follows:
[The bill will] help provide stronger ability of a city to release
or discipline some of their employees . . . . We are giving
city councils and administrations the ability to fire employees
House floor debate, 2/11/04, Rep. Ure speaking, available at http://www.le.state.ut.us/
asp/audio/index.asp?Sess=2004GS&Day=O&Bill=SB0023SOl&House-H.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The City's arguments in this appeal rest on a fundamental principle: It is unfair
and inequitable to allow an employee to repudiate the obligations of an agreement she
voluntarily entered into and under which she has received substantial benefits for nine
years. Ms. Ho wick argues that this Court must examine the contract Ms. Ho wick made
with the City and determine that it is void and unenforceable. To the contrary, it is
unnecessary for this Court to determine whether the Contract at issue in this case is
enforceable.

Ms. Howick, a lawyer, is estopped from attacking the validity of the

contract because she accepted the benefits of the agreement, including a substantial
increase in pay and-benefits, for nine years. Similarly, Ms. Howick waived her right to
attack the validity of the contract because she as a lawyer knowingly and voluntarily
waived her statutory and constitutional right to an appeal. It is well established that an
individual may waive a statutory right as long as the rights of others are not affected. In
this case, Ms. Howick's agreement governed her situation only, and no public policy is
implicated in her individual decision to become at-will.
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Ms. Howick argues that her position is just one of many that the City illegally
designated as at-will in its employment and compensation plans, and she asserts that her
action is intended to force the City to discontinue at-will classifications. Br. of Appellant
at 38. Ms. Howick's argument is not well taken because her at-will status and the
Board's decision were based on her individual agreement to become at-will in 1998, not
on any compensation plan or other policy. Ms. Howick also ignores that, by statute, this
Court's review is limited to whether the Board abused its discretion in making its
decision regarding Ms. Howick, based on the administrative record. Even if this Court
concludes the agreement between Ms. Howick and the City was illegal, it may still
enforce the contract because the facts of this case demonstrate that justice will be served
by enforcement of the contract.
Ms. Howick further asserts that the City violated her constitutional right to receive
due process. However, Ms. Howick has not demonstrated that this Court has jurisdiction
to hear her constitutional claim, nor has she shown that she had a sufficient property
interest in her employment with the City; therefore, her constitutional claim is without
merit.

Additionally, even if it were assumed that Ms. Howick was entitled to due

process, she received it; she presented her arguments to the Board in an extensive brief
which the Board considered.

The Board complied with its mandated procedures

throughout the process, and properly determined that Ms. Howick did not have a right to
appeal her discharge to the Board.
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Ms. Howick is not entitled to attorney fees (even if she were to prevail) because no
statute or contract authorizes an award of attorney fees. None of the equitable grounds on
which she seeks to recover her fees has any merit.
Finally, Ms. Howick is not entitled to the remedy of reinstatement thai she seeks.
It is the Board that has authority to address reinstatement. This Court only has authority
to affirm or reverse the decision of the Board. Thus, even if Ms. Howick were to prevail,
the most she would be entitled to is a hearing before the Board.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DECISION OF THE BOARD SHOULD BE REVIEWED FOR ABUSE
OF DISCRETION OR REASONABLENESS.
The governing statute provides that this Court shall review the Board's decisions

under the abuse of discretion standard: "The Court of Appeals' review shall be . . . for
the purpose of determining if the appeal board abused its discretion or exceeded its
authority."5 Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(6)(c). Ms. Howick argues that the "correction
of error" standard of review should be applied. Br. of Appellant at 10. Ms. Howick's
argument is incorrect.
Where the decision of an administrative body applies the law to the facts (a mixed
question of law and fact), the standard of review is the deferential standard of
"reasonableness."
5

This Court's review of Ms. Howick's appeal must be "on the record of the appeal
board." Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(6)(c). However, Ms. Howick has cited in her brief
to many materials that are extraneous to the record. See Br. of Appellant at 5 n.2, 37-38
nn.16 & 17, and Appellant's App'x 3 (2008 city compensation plan and staff report); id,
at 13 n.6 (citing to a Salt Lake Tribune article). These documents are outside the
administrative record and should be disregarded, as should any argument based on them.
4826-7992-78113
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Agency decisions that apply the law to facts are entitled to
discretion and are only subject to judicial review to assure
that they fall within the limits of reasonableness and
rationality.
Allen v. Dept. of Workforce Services. 2005 UT App 186, ^[6, 112 P.3d 1238, 1241
(citation omitted); see also Savage Indus, v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 667
(Utah 1991) ("[AJgency decisions involving mixed questions of law and fact ... given
deference by the courts and . . . upheld as long as . . . within the bounds of reasonableness
and rationality."); Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 27 n.4 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991) ("[M]ixed questions of law and fact [are] matters reserved for the discretion
of the administrative body.. . . [T]he standard of review for such questions is one of
reasonableness . . . . " ) .
In the instant case, the Board's decision was its determination that Ms. Howick
was not entitled to an appeal to the Board. Statement of Facts ("Facts") f 18. In making
its decision, the Board applied the provisions of its Policies and Procedures regarding
who was entitled to an appeal, and relied on the independent legal opinion of attorney
Stanley Preston. Id Mr. Preston applied the legal doctrine of "waiver" to the fact of Ms.
Howick's voluntarily signing of an agreement in 1998 to become an at-will employee in
exchange for consideration which she received. Facts ^ 16-17. On this basis, Mr.
Preston concluded that Ms. Howick had knowingly and voluntarily waived her statutory
rights and lawfully became an at-will employee in 1998. Id. The Board adopted Mr.
Preston's analysis and concluded that Ms. Howick was not entitled to an appeal. Facts
118.
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In short, the Board's decision applied the law to the facts and hence was a "mixed
question of law and fact." As such, the Board's decision should be reviewed under the
deferential standard of "reasonableness" or "abuse of discretion."6
Ms. Howick ignores the fact that the Board was making a mixed decision of law
and fact, and treats the decision as if it were a matter of pure legal interpretation. Br. of
Appellant at 10.

While Ms. Howick's characterization of the Board's decision is

incorrect, the same deferential standard of review would apply even if her
characterization were accepted. This is so because where, as here, the governing statute
grants discretion to the administrative body, that body's legal interpretations are entitled
to review under the deferential standard of "reasonableness."

"[Ajbsent a grant of

discretion," an agency's interpretation of law is reviewed under the "correction-of-error"
standard. However, where there is an "explicit or implicit grant of discretion contained in
the governing statute," "it is appropriate to grant the agency deference." Morton Int'l,
Inc. v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814P.2d581, 588 (Utah 1991);
Savage, 811 P.2d at 668 (deference to agency's decisions of law where legislature
granted agency discretion).7

In arguing that the Board's decision should be reviewed under the correction-of-error
standard, Ms. Howick quotes Tolman, addressing the standard of review that would be
applicable where no discretion is granted to the agency or where the agency "has stepped
out of the arena of [its] discretion" and "crossed the law" in making a purely legal
determination. 818 P.2d at 27-28. In the instant case, the governing statutes grant
discretion to the City and the Board, the Board did not exceed the boundaries of its
discretion and made a mixed decision of law and fact, not a pure determination of law.
Hence, the standard of "reasonableness" or "abuse of discretion" should be applied.
Deference to an administrative body's decisions is not limited to where the agency has
4826-7992-78113
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That the governing statutes grant discretion to the Board is clear from the language
of the statutes themselves. First, Section 10-3-1105(3) expressly leaves to municipalities
the unlimited authority to decide on appropriate reasons for an employee's discharge.
Second, Section 10-3-1106(6) expressly states that this Court is to review the Board's
decision to determine if it "abused its discretion." Third, Section 10-3-1106 does not
provide a standard for determining the propriety of an employee's discharge, but leaves
o

that up the municipality. Fourth, the statute delegates to the municipality the authority to
determine both "the procedure for conducting an appeal" and the "standard of review" to
be applied. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(7)(a). Fifth, under the Board's Procedures, it is
the Board that has the authority to determine "whether a City employee is within the class
of persons who may appeal [his/her] discharge," and the Board may request a legal
opinion on that issue in making its determination. Procedures § III.G, attached hereto as
App'x 2. Finally, the legislative history of the statute, in its current form, shows that the
statute was intended to strengthen the power of cities to discharge employees: "We are
giving city councils and administrations the ability to fire employees." Facts ^[25.
In sum, the governing statute provides "an explicit or implicit grant of discretion"
to the Board to determine "whether a City employee is within the class of persons who
special expertise or experience, although that is one basis for deferring to agency action.
Morton, 814 P.2d at 588; Savage, 811 P.2d at 668. The Utah Supreme Court, in Morton,
noted that under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, deference to an agency's
decision does not require and is not predicated on agency expertise or experience. 814
P.2d at 588.
O

Compare Section 10-3-1106, which contains no standard, with Section 10-3-1012(1)
(which does not apply to Ms. Howick) which specifies limited permitted grounds for an
employee's discharge.
4826-7992-7811 3
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may appeal" his/her discharge and to rely on a properly obtained legal opinion in making
its decision. Morton, 814 P.2d at 588; Procedures § III.G, attached hereto as App'x 2.
Accordingly, the Board's decision, even if it were construed as a pure legal interpretation,
is entitled to "deference" and review only for "reasonableness."

Morton, 814P.2d

at 588; Tolman, 818 P.2d at 27 n.4.
It is clear from the record that the Board acted reasonably and did not abuse its
discretion. It followed the required procedures each step of the way, from when it first
received Ms. Howick's appeal to when it made its final decision. At its first meeting the
Board recognized that the first issue confronting it was whether it had the authority to
accept Ms. Howick's appeal. Facts <|9. The Board invited Ms. Howick and the City to
present their positions on the issue. Ms. Howick did so by submitting an extensive brief.
Id. Faced with conflicting arguments from the parties^ the Board requested a legal
opinion as it was permitted to do by its governing procedures. The City Attorney acted
properly in recusing himself from providing a legal opinion because of his conflict of
interest. Pursuant to the City's Code, the City Attorney requested that an independent
outside legal counsel provide the legal opinion.

Id ^[13. The independent outside

counsel did so, and concluded that Ms. Howick was an at-will employee because she had
waived her statutory rights when she voluntarily agreed to become an at-will employee in
exchange for consideration.

Id. ^[16-17. The Board relied on the legal opinion in

determining that, under the governing policies and procedures, Ms. Howick's appeal to
the Board was not proper. Id ^[18. In making its decision, the Board did not exceed its
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authority, but acted reasonably in exercising the decision-making authority granted to it.
Accordingly, Ms. Howick's appeal to this Court should be dismissed.9
II.

MS. HOWICK IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING THAT THE
CONTRACT IS INVALID BECAUSE SHE ACCEPTED THE BENEFITS
OF THE CONTRACT FOR NINE YEARS, TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE
CITY.
Ms. Howick contends that the at-will Disclaimer she executed with the City,

wherein she elected to become an at-will employee, is void and unenforceable because it
was formed in contravention of state statute. Br. of Appellant at 22. However, it is
unnecessary for this Court to determine whether the contract at issue in this case is
enforceable. Ms. Howick is estopped from attacking the validity of the contract because
she accepted the benefits (a substantial increase in pay and benefits) of the agreement.
As the members of the Board noted, Ms. Howick had agreed in writing to be at-will and
had remained an at-will employee for nine years. Facts ^f 10.
Equitable estoppel requires
(1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party
inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (2) reasonable action
or inaction by the other party taken on the basis of the first
party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (3)
9

The Board's decision may be upheld on the alternative ground that the Board did not
have the authority to determine that Ms. Howick was other than at-will. It is undisputed
that Ms. Howick was classified as an at-will employee at the time of her termination.
Ms. Howick acknowledged that fact, but argued to the Board that under state law her atwill status was unlawful. R. 33, 50-60 ("[W]hether the City could legally classify Ms.
Howick's position as at-will... is a question of law . . ."). However, under its governing
Procedures, "the Board ha[d] no authority to determine the City's legal liability
under. .. state law." Procedures § I.C at R.40 and App'x 2. Accordingly, as the City
explained to the Board, the Board could not "look behind" Ms. Howick's admitted at-will
status to see if it was lawful under state law. R. 29-30. For this additional reason, the
Board's decision that Ms. Howick was at-will and not entitled to an appeal was correct.
4826-7992-7811 3
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injury to the second party that would result from allowing the
first party to contradict or repudiate such statement,
admission, act or failure to act.
Whitaker v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 2008 UT App 282, ^[22, 191 P.3d 814; see also
Nunlev v. Westates Casing Servs., Inc., 1999 UT 100, 1J34, 989 P.2d 1077. Equitable
estoppel prevents a party from "denying the validity of [a] contract when one party has
relied on another party's conduct." Glew v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 2007 UT 56, 181 P.3d 791,
798.

Furthermore, "one of the most familiar applications of the rule relating to

acceptance of benefits arises*in case of contracts. It has been repeatedly held that a
person by acceptance of benefits may be estopped from questioning the existence,
validity and effect of a contract" Tanner v. Provo Reservoir Co., 289 P. 151, 154 (Utah
1930) (emphasis added). "Where a person with actual or constructive knowledge of the
facts induces another by his words or conduct to believe that he acquiesces in or ratifies a
transaction, or that he will offer no opposition thereto, and that other, in reliance on such
belief, alters his position, such person is estopped from repudiating the transaction to the
other's prejudice." Id; cf. Pelton's Spudnuts v. Doane, 234 P.2d 852, 855 (Utah 1951)
("If a party continues to exercise the privileges of a franchise . . . he is not in any position
to deny the obligations which attach to such use.").
This doctrine has been applied in many cases like the instant case, where a party
contracted with a governmental entity, received the benefits of the contract, and later
sought to have the contract declared void. For example, in Kiewit W. Co. v. City and
County of Denver, 902 P.2d 421 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994), a general contractor who agreed
to construct several runways at the Denver Airport and had received payment under the
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contract was estopped from later asserting that the contract was contrary to the Colorado
Constitution and the Denver City Charter. Id. at 423. The appellate court determined
that it did not have to consider the validity of the contract, and instead held that "having
received and retained the benefits under the contract/' the contractor was "estopped to
assert that the . . . contract was ultra vires or unconstitutional." Id (citing City of
Colorado Springs v. Kitty Hawk Dev. Co., 392 P.2d 467 (1964)). The same result was
reached in Lone Pine Corp. v. City of Ft. Lupton, 653 P.2d 405 (Colo. App. 1982), where
two land developers sought to have their contract with the municipality declared void
based on it being ultra vires and therefore illegal. In exchange for the municipality's
zoning and platting approval, the contract required the developers to make payments to
the city's school district to offset the impact of increased school enrollment. The court
held that because the district relied on the agreement and already conferred benefits on
the developers, the developers were estopped from denying the obligations of the contact.
Id. at 406. See also Baukol Builders, Inc. v. County of Grand Forks, 2008 ND 116, ffi[912, 751 N.W.2d 191 (holding that a builder who had received the benefits of a contract
could not go back and assert that the city's bidding process had been contrary to statute);
Boulder Brook Acres, Inc. v. Town & Vill. of Scarsdale, 91 N.Y.S.2d 785, 786 (N.Y.
App. 1985) ("[PJlaintiff is estopped from attacking the validity of the deed conveying the
property. Having accepted the benefits resulting from an approval of a subdivision of its
property, it cannot now seek to avoid the corresponding obligations."); Cluggish v.
Koons, 43 N.E. 158, 160 (Ind. Ct. App. 1896) ("It has been time and time again decided
that a property holder who quietly permits money to be expended or labor to be done by
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another, which benefits his lands, under a contract with a municipality or other
constituted authorities, is estopped to deny that the municipality or authorities had the
power to make the contract.").

As demonstrated below, the elements of equitable

estoppel are met in this case, and it would be unfair and unjust to allow Ms. Howick to
now declare her contract with the City unenforceable.
A.

Ms, Howick Voluntarily Entered Into the At-Will Contract and
Thereby Agreed that She Was Waiving Her Right to an Appeal, Which
is Inconsistent With Her Current Argument

The first requirement of equitable estoppel is that there be "a statement admission,
act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted." See Whitaker,
2008 UT App 282 at f22. Here, the "act" at issue is Ms. Howick's agreement to become
an at-will employee in exchange for a substantial increase in pay and benefits. Facts ^[2.
This agreement was entirely voluntary and not coerced; in fact, a number of employees
faced with the same decision as Ms. Howick chose not to become at-will. Id. As a
lawyer, Ms. Howick clearly knew that becoming "at will" meant that she could be
discharged for any reason and would not be entitled to appeal the decision. IdL; see also
Preston Opinion, R. 85 and App'x 5 ("There is no allegation by Ms. Howick that her
signing the Disclaimer was anything other than voluntary on her part and in exchange for
an increase in pay, which she subsequently received."). Her act of agreeing to become atwill in exchange for a substantial pay increase is directly inconsistent with the claim
Ms. Howick now asserts—that she is entitled to a hearing before the Board.
[I]f a public employee has served in an unclassified position
and has enjoyed the benefits of the unclassified status such as
increased salary, then as a matter of equity and fairness, the
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employee should be precluded from claiming classified status
in order to receive the statutory benefits afforded classified
civil servants.
Chubb v. Ohio Bureau of Worker's Compensation, 690 N.E.2d 1267, 1269 (Ohio 1998).
The first element of equitable estoppel is met.
B-

Salt Lake City Relied on Ms. Howick's Agreement To Be At-Will and
Provided Her With a Substantial Increase in Pay and Benefits.

The second requirement of equitable estoppel is that there be reasonable "action or
inaction by the other party taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act,
or failure to act." Whitaker, 2008 UT App 282 at f22. It is beyond dispute that this
requirement is satisfied here.

Ms. Howick acknowledges that in exchange for her

agreement to become an at-will employee, she received increased pay and benefits. Br.
of Appellant at 4. This action by Salt Lake City was taken solely on the basis of
Ms. Howick's act—her agreement that she could be terminated for any reason and would
not be entitled to appeal the decision. The City, therefore, "change[d] its position in
justifiable reliance on the conduct" of Ms. Howick. Lone Pine Corp., 653 P.2d at 406.
C.

If Ms. Howick is Permitted to
Will Suffer Injury Because
Substantial Sum of Money;
Suffered Injury By Having to
This Legal Action.

Repudiate the Contract Salt Lake City
it Has Already Paid Ms. Howick a
Indeed, Salt Lake City Has Already
Expend Time and Resources to Defend

Finally, for equitable estoppel to prevent repudiation of a contract, there must be
"injury to the second party that would result from allowing the first party to contradict or
repudiate such statement, admission, act or failure to act." Whitaker, 2008 UT App 282
at 1J22.
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Salt Lake City will be injured—and has already been injured—by not getting its
benefit of the bargain, which is being able to terminate Ms. Howick at will and without a
hearing. As already noted, Salt Lake City has already paid Ms. Howick a substantial sum
in increased salary and benefits and did so to avoid having to expend time and resources
handling claims of the sort asserted here by Ms. Howick. Facts <|2.
Equitable estoppel is "imposed by law in the interest of fairness to prevent the
enforcement of rights which would work fraud or injustice upon the person against whom
enforcement is sought and who, in justifiable reliance upon the opposing party's words
or conduct, has been misled into acting upon the belief that such enforcement would
not be sought:' Ionosphere Clubs, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of the State of Pa., 85 F.3d 992, 999
(2d Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).10 This element of estoppel is met here, as Salt Lake
City acted upon the assurance that Ms. Howick would not seek to appeal a termination
decision, and Ms. Howick cannot now, nine years after the fact, seek to repudiate a
contract from which she has benefitted for so long.

Ms. Howick also asserts in her brief that her at-will status is void because Salt Lake
City created the at-will position through unenforceable City ordinances, policies and
procedures. The basis of Ms. Howick's at-will status was the agreement she signed in
1998, not the policies, compensation plans, etc. that she refers to. The City Counsel Staff
Report and the compensation plan attached to Ms. Howick's Brief were created in 2008
and did not exist at the time she agreed to become at-will. Moreover, the principles of
equitable estoppel apply in the same manner as that already described in the circumstance
of one who accepts benefits under ordinances or policies/procedures and then seeks to
declare the ordinance or policy/procedures void. See Rhodus v. Geatley, 147 S.W.2d
631, 637 (Mo. 1941) ("Estoppel is frequently based upon the acceptance and retention by
one having knowledge or notice of the facts of benefits from a transaction, contract,
instrument, regulation, or statute which he might have rejected or contested.").
4826-7992-78113
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III.

MS. HOWICK WAIVED ANY STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO RECEIVE A HEARING BEFORE THE BOARD.
Similarly, Ms. Howick is also not entitled to a hearing because she waived any

statutory or constitutional entitlement she may have had to a hearing. "A waiver is the
intentional relinquishment of a known right, benefit, or advantage, a knowledge of its
existence, and an intention to relinquish it. [The relinquishment] must be distinctly made,
although it may be express or implied." Anderson v. Thompson, 2008 UT App 3, f37,
176 P.3d 464 (alteration in original); see also Yates v. Am. Repubs. Corp., 163 F.2d 178,
180 (10th Cir. 1947) (stating that elements of waiver are (1) an existing right, (2)
knowledge of the right, and (3) an intention to relinquish the right, and holding "one in
possession of a right of that kind may effectively waive it by acts, conduct, declarations,
acquiescence, or silence where duty requires that he speak").
A,

Ms. Howick Has Waived Her Statutory Rights,

It is well-established that a party may waive statutory rights through a contract.
"It is everywhere recognized that the person for whose benefit a [statutory] provision is
made may waive it when it does not affect the rights of others." Palmer v. Broadbent
260 P.2d 581, 586 (Utah 1953); see also Tustian v. Schriever, 2001 UT 84, f 16, 34 P.3d
755 ("[A] party may waive the benefit of a statute enacted for protection of the party,
providing the waiver does not infringe public policy or morals." (citing 83 CJ.S.
Stipulations § 28)).
Here, by knowingly and voluntarily signing the at-will disclaimer and thereby
agreeing to become an at-will employee, Ms. Howick waived any right to the process
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contained in Utah Code section 10-3-1106. Ms. Howick is an attorney who had practiced
at the Salt Lake City Attorneys Office for six years at the time she voluntarily agreed to
became at-will. Facts ffi[l-2. She knew that she was giving up her right to a hearing or
other process upon termination in exchange for an increase in pay and benefits. See
Preston Opinion, R. 85 and App'x 5 ("There is no allegation by Ms. Howick that her
signing the Disclaimer was anything other than voluntary on her part and in exchange for
an increase in pay, which she subsequently received."). Her waiver and agreement with
the City were particularized to her individual circumstances and did not affect anyone
else.

No one else's employment status or rights were impacted by Ms. Howick's

voluntary and knowing waiver. See Palmer, 260 P.2d at 586.
Ms. Howick is challenging only her employment status and appeal rights,11 and no
infringement of public policy is involved. The term "public policy" is not "subject to
precise definition," but matters of public policy in general are "of such fundamental
concern to society that the right of individuals to order their affairs by contract may yield
to society's interest in preserving or advancing the matter." Lee v. Thorpe, 2006 UT 66,
l

|f24, 147 P.3d 443. Although constitutions and statutes are often the source of public

policy, '"this does not mean that all statements made in a statute are expressions of
public policy;" id (quoting Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1282 (Utah 1992)

Ms. Howick asks this Court to invalidate the provisions of City ordinances and
policies/procedures that allegedly exceed the City's statutory authority. However, this
Court only has the jurisdiction to review Ms. Howick's individualized agreement,
because that was all that was considered by the Board, and to determine if the Board's
decision should be affirmed or reversed under the abuse of discretion standard.
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(emphasis added), unless the statute at issue contains a "purposeful legislative
expression[] of public policy," id. (citing Utah Code section 53A-12-201, which states
that "[i]t is the public policy of this state that public education shall be free"). See also
Ockev v. Lehmen 2008 UT 37, 1123-24, 189 P.3d 51 (holding, in case where plaintiff
asserted that conveyance was void due to lack of authority of trustees to transfer property,
that conveyance was not per se unenforceable on public policy grounds as "no statute
declares ultra vires acts by trustees absolutely void as against public policy," and
contrasting plaintiffs case with previous case arising under a different statute, Utah Code
Ann. §§ 50-1-1 through -6, which declares that contracts formed to control prices are
void as against public policy); Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp., 2007 UT 96, ^12, 175 P.3d
560 (construing Utah Code section 78-27-51, which states that "as a matter of public
policy, no person engaged in that sport [of skiing] shall recover from a ski operator for
injuries resulting from those inherent risks" (emphasis added)).
Here, the statutes that Ms. Howick contends Salt Lake City violated are found at
Utah Code sections 10-3-1105 and -1106. Br. of Appellant at 11. Nowhere in these two
statutes or in the entire statutory scheme in which these statutes are contained is there a
statement of public policy declaring agreements formed in alleged violation of these
statutes void and unenforceable. Nothing in Section 10-3-1105 or 10-3-1106 prohibits an
employee from making an agreement to waive his/her rights under the statutes.

In

Actionable '"public policy5 is far narrower than what may typically be characterized as
'public policy.'" Where the parties are not prohibited from modifying their obligations
by contract, a statute does not embody an actionable public policy. Ryan v. Dan's Food
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contrast, other Utah statutes dealing with employee rights, such as the Employment
Security Act and the Workers Compensation Act, expressly prohibit waivers of statutory
rights. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-108(1) (employee may not agree to waive rights to
workers compensation benefits) & Utah Code Ann. § 34A-4-103(l)(a) ("any agreement
by an individual to waive, release, or commute his rights to [unemployment] benefits or
any other rights under this chapter is void."). Additionally, in amending 10-3-1105 and
10-3-1106 in 2004 to allow municipal authorities to decide grounds for terminations and
the procedure and standard of review for conducting appeals, the amendment's sponsor
stated that the changes were intended to strengthen cities' ability "to fire employees."
Facts ^25.
Ms. Howick's waiver of her appeal rights is not a matter of such "fundamental
concern to society" that public policy is implicated. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has
urged courts to exercise extreme caution in determining that a silent statute embodies a
particular public policy:
To pluck a principle of public policy from the text of a statute
and to ground a decision of this court on that principle is to
invite judicial mischief.. . . [P]ublic policy is a protean
substance that is too often easily shaped to satisfy the
preferences of a judge rather than the will of the people or
the intentions of the Legislature. We aptly noted the risks of
relying on public policy rationales when we stated that "the
theory of public policy embodies a doctrine of vague and
variable quality, and, unless deducible in the giver
circumstances from constitutional or statutory provisions,
should be accepted as a basis for judicial determinations, if at
all, with only the utmost circumspection."
Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 405 (Utah 1998); Rackley v. Fairview Care Centers, Inc.,
2001 UT 32, U 17, 23 P.2d 1022, 1027 (Utah 2001).
4826-7992-78113

27

Rothstein, 2007 UT 96, at ^10 (quoting Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033,
1043 (Utah 1998) (emphasis added).

This Court should use caution and uphold

Ms. Howick's knowing and voluntary waiver of any presumed statutory right to appeal
her termination to the Board because the statutes at issue do not embody a matter of
public policy.
B,

Ms. Howick Waived Her Constitutional Rights.

It is also beyond dispute that a party is able to waive constitutional protections,
including due process rights, through an agreement. See State v. Rhinehart 2007 UT 61,
ffi[15-18, 167 P.3d 1046 (stating guilty plea waives alleged pre-plea constitutional
violations); Jenkins v. Percival 962 P.2d 796, 800 (Utah 1998) (holding arbitration
agreements can waive constitutional right of access to the courts); Legg v. Bd. of
Pardons, No. 20060729-CA, 2007 WL 1576394, at *1 n.2 (prisoner's signing of a "Time
Waiver For Parole Revocation Hearing" waived any claim that he was denied procedural
due process).

Ms. Howick's act of signing the at-will disclaimer waived her

constitutional right to due process.
IV.

EVEN ASSUMING MS, HOWICK'S CONTRACT WITH THE CITY WAS
ILLEGAL, A BALANCE OF THE EQUITIES FAVORS ENFORCEMENT.
Ms. Howick asserts that "Salt Lake City attempts to give itself an expanded power

to designate at-will positions in violation of [s]ections 10-3-1105 and 10-3-1106 by
contract. However, all of Salt Lake City's contractual efforts to create at-will positions
and deny statutory protections in violation of [sjections 10-3-1105 and 10-3-1106 are
void." Br. of Appellant at 21. Even assuming Ms. Howick is correct in her assertion that
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her contract with the City is illegal and therefore void, the Contract may still be
enforceable.
"Despite the general rule that every contract in violation of law is void, the fact
that a contract serves a prohibited purpose does not necessarily make the contract
unenforceable." Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, f39, 48 P.3d 918.
Survey of the authorities reveals that when contracts involve
gambling, immorality or violation of laws purposed to the
protection of health, morals or welfare, the law, as a matter of
policy, regards the contracts as void and refuses to take
cognizance thereof or to grant any relief. However, arbitrary
refusal to grant relief under contracts merely in violation of
statute often brings about such incongruous results in giving
advantages to wrongdoers and penalizing the relatively
innocent that the courts have carved out so many exceptions
to the so called "general rule" that it can hardly be properly so
denominated.
McCormick v. Life Ins. Corp. of Am., 308 P.2d 949, 951 (Utah 1957). Instead of
declaring illegal or void contracts per se unenforceable, courts may look at the "over-all
picture of each such questioned contract" and "determine upon the facts of the individual
case whether the ends of justice demand that relief be granted."

Id. at 952. The

following factors are examined: "(a) the degree of criminality or evil involved; (b) the
moral quality of the conduct of the parties; (c) comparison between them as to guilt or
innocence; (d) the equities between them; and (e) the effect upon third parties or the
public." Id
An examination of the factors in this case demonstrates that, on balance, the
contract between Salt Lake City and Ms. Howick should be enforced. First, there is
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nothing to suggest that any criminality or evil intent was involved in the formation of this
contract, and neither party has conducted itself in a morally questionable manner.
Both the equities between the parties and the effect upon the public favor
enforcement. As already described, Ms. Howick, after having worked as an attorney for
the City for six years, voluntarily chose to accept a substantial increase in pay and
benefits in exchange for becoming at-will. Facts ^[1, 2. Ms. Howick served in her atwill position for nine years, never once complaining about her supposed illegal status,
and all the while accepting the increase in pay and benefits that came with the agreement
she signed. Because she was a municipal employee, taxpayer money was used to pay
Ms. Howick's increased salary and benefits.

This is not the situation where if the

contract is enforced, it will cost the taxpayers money—in fact, just the opposite is-true:
more taxpayer dollars will be expended if Ms. Howick's contract is not enforced and the
City has to provide her with a hearing and continue to defend its position throughout a
process to which she is not entitled.

Indeed, if Ms. Howick truly believes that the

contract was void from the beginning, she has been unjustly enriched at the taxpayers'
expense and would be liable for the overpayment on that ground.
The City believed what it was getting from the contract was the certainty of being
able to terminate Ms. Howick at-will and without undergoing the time and expense of an
appeal. The efficiencies of being able to terminate unsatisfactory employees who are
designated at-will are beneficial to the municipal government, the taxpayers of the
municipal government, and society at large.
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In light of freedom of contract, courts have "a duty to employ any reasonable
construction to declare contracts lawful and not in contravention of public welfare."
Ockey, 2008 UT 37 at f 24 (quotations omitted). Ms. Howick exercised her freedom of
contract to be appointed to the at-will position. The contract should be enforced, and this
Court should determine that Ms. Howick is not entitled to an appeal before the Board.
V,

THE BOARD HAD NO JURISDICTION
TO HEAR THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS, NOR DOES THIS COURT NOW
HAVE JURISDICTION BECAUSE IT IS ONLY EMPOWERED TO
REVIEW THE DECISION OF THE BOARD.
No jurisdiction exists for this Court to hear Ms. Howick's constitutional

arguments. "Both courts and quasi-judicial administrative agencies . .. must have subject
matter jurisdiction to validly decide a controversy. Therefore, the initial inquiry of any
[adjudicative body] should always be to determine whether the requested action is within
its jurisdiction." Blaine Hudson Printing v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 870 P.2d 291, 292
(UtahCt.App. 1994).
The Board could not have heard Ms. Howick's constitutional due process
arguments because nothing in Utah Code section 10-3-1106 permits the Board to
consider such issues, and nothing in the rules governing the Board allows the
consideration of constitutional issues. Indeed, the Board has no authority to determine
"the City's legal liability under federal or state law." Procedures § I.C. (App'x 2). While
an employee is allowed to appeal a decision of the Board to this Court, the statute limits
what this Court may consider: "The Court of Appeals' review shall be on the record of
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the appeal board and for the purpose of determining if the appeal board abused its
discretion or exceeded its authority" Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(c) (emphasis added).
In sum, the jurisdiction of the Board is narrow—the Board does not have the
statutory authority to examine or determine constitutional issues. If the Court of Appeals
may only look at the record of the Board to determine if there was an abuse of discretion,
it necessarily follows that the Court of Appeals must circumscribe its review to the
narrow issue determined by that Board, as reflected in the record. As a result, in this
case, Ms. Howick's constitutional arguments must be disregarded as they are not in the
record of the Board, were not, and could not have been, determined by the Board, and are
thus beyond the Court's subject matter jurisdiction in this case.13
VL

MS. HO WICK'S DUE PROCESS ARGUMENTS ARE WITHOUT MERIT.
A.

Ms. Howick Does Not Have a Protected Property Interest in Her
Employment.

Ms. Howick cites Lucas v. Murray City Civil Serv. Comm'n, 949 P.2d 746 (Utah
Ct. App. 1997) for the principle that public employees may have a property right in
employment if "contractual or statutory provisions guarantee continued employment
absent 'sufficient cause' for discharge." IdL at 752.

13

It should be noted that the lack of opportunity to present the due process argument
before the Employee Appeals Board and this Court does not deny Ms. Howick of all
opportunities to advance this claim. Ms. Howick can file for relief in the district court
through, for example, an extraordinary writ. Blaine Hudson Printing, 870 P.2d at 294.
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It is undeniable that Ms. Howick cannot look to any contractual provisions for a
protected property interest.

Indeed, it is the contract that Ms. Howick voluntarily

executed with the City that eliminated the right to process upon termination.14 Facts ^}2.
Ms. Howick asserts, incorrectly, that Utah Code sections 10-3-1105 and -1106
create a constitutional property right. In Board of Regents v. Roth, the United States
Supreme Court stated that to have a property interest in employment, "a person clearly
must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a
unilateral expectation of it. He must instead have a legitimate claim of entillement to it."
408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
Furthermore, to create a property interest, the statute relied upon "must provide
more than procedure, for there is neither a liberty nor a property interest In procedures
themselves.... In order to give rise to a constitutionally protected property interest, a
statute or ordinance must go beyond mere procedural guarantees to provide some
substantive criteria limiting the state's discretion—as can be found, for example, in a
requirement that employees be fired only for cause." Colburn v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 739
F.Supp. 1268, 1289 (S.D. Ind. 1990); see also Kingsford v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist, 247
F.3d 1123, 1129 (10th Cir. 2001) ("It is well established in this circuit. .. that procedural
protections alone do not create a claim of entitlement to continued public employment.
Rather, a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued public employment arises only

As discussed supra, Ms. Howick, by signing the "at-will disclaimer" waived her due
process rights. Her constitutional argument fails for this reason as well as the others
discussed in this section of Appellee's brief.
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when there are substantive restrictions on the ability of the employer to terminate the
employee.").15
In Lucas, this Court examined Utah Code section 10-3-1012, which states:
All persons in the classified civil service may be . . . removed
from office or employment by the head of the department for
misconduct, incompetency, failure to perform his [or her]
duties, or failure to observe properly the rules of the
department, but subject to appeal by the suspended or
discharged person to the civil service commission . . . which
shall fully hear and determine the matter.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012 (emphasis added).16 This language created a property
interest because it "specifically listfed] the reasons for which a civil service employee
may be discharged" and therefore, with "unmistakable clarity,55 granted employees
security against discharge without cause. IcL

n

See also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (same);
Bunger v. Univ. of Okla., 95 F.3d 987, 991 (10th Cir. 1996) (same); Silver, I., Public
Employee Discharge & Discipline § 17.04[B], at 1134 ("The existence of certain
procedural protections has been almost uniformly held insufficient to warrant
constitutional due process protection.55)
16

It is beyond dispute that Ms. Howick would not be covered by this statute because she
is not in the classified civil service, which
consists] of all places of employment now existing or
hereafter created in or under the police department and the
fire department of each first or second class city that
establishes a civil service commission and the health
department in each first class city that establishes a civil
service commission, except the head of the departments,
deputy chiefs of the police and fire departments, and assistant
chiefs of the police department in cities of the first and second
class, and the members of the board of health of the
departments.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1002(1).
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By contrast, here, the controlling statutes contain nothing even remotely
resembling a for-cause standard as is found in Section 10-3-1012(1). Ms. Howick first
cites Section 10-3-1105(1) as creating a "for-cause" standard, yet this section merely
provides that a covered employee may be discharged "as provided in Section 10-3-1106."
Section 10-3-1106 does not contain a "for-cause" standard for discharge, nor does it list
particular reasons for which a discharge may properly occur.

Ms. Howick cites to

Section 10-3-1106(3), as if it creates a "for-cause" standard. It does not but merely
states, unremarkably: "Upon receipt of the referral from the municipal recorder, the
appeal board shall forthwith commence its investigation, take and receive evidence, and
fully hear and determine the matter which relates to the cause for the discharge,
suspension, or transfer." Id. § 10-3-1106(3)(b)(ii). Indeed, the Legislature expressly
stated that it was not creating a for-cause standard in these sections but was leaving such
matters to individual municipalities.

Id §10-3-1105(3) (neither § 10-3-1105 nor

§ 10-3-1106 "may be construed to limit a municipality's ability" to decide appropriate
reasons for an employee's termination). As pointed out above, the Board applies a very
deferential abuse of discretion standard of review.

See fn. 4 supra.

Ms. Howick's

attempt to torture the language in these statutes into a property interest fails. At most,
sections -1105 and -1106 provide required procedural steps, which, as discussed, do not
create a property interest.
In sum, in Ms. Howick's case, there is no "contractual or statutory provision
guarantee[ing] continued employment absent 'sufficient cause' for discharge," as
required by Lucas. 949 P.2d at 752. Because Ms. Howick did not have a property
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interest in her employment, her constitutional due process claim lacks an essential
element and should be dismissed.
B.

Even Assuming Ms, Howick Has A Protected Property Interest the
Process Given to Ms. Howick Satisfies the Constitution.

If this Court determines that Ms. Howick has a protected property interest, it
should nonetheless determine that due process has been satisfied. The Board followed its
own procedures to the letter and did not abuse its discretion.
As previously described, after Ms. Howick was discharged, she submitted a Notice
of Appeal to the Board. Facts ^4. Because Ms. Howick was at-will, the City's Labor
Relations Officer sent Ms. Howick's counsel a letter explaining that no appeal was
available because the Board did not have jurisdiction. IdL ^[5; see Procedures § III.A,
attached hereto as App'x 2 ("Any City officer or employee to whom these procedures
apply may appeal a discharge . . . ." (emphasis added)). Ms. Howick then appealed to
this Court, and this Court dismissed the appeal on the ground it lacked jurisdiction
because there had been no final action of the Board. Facts ^[8.
Nevertheless, responding to the suggestion in the Court of Appeals' Memorandum
Decision that the Labor Relations Officer could not issue a final agency action, the City
then forwarded Ms. Howick's appeal to the Board. Facts f 8. The Board recognized that
Ms. Howick had to be entitled to an appeal in order for it to properly consider her claim,
and that its initial inquiry was whether it could accept her appeal. Id ^[9. The Board
invited both sides to submit their respective positions on the issue, and Ms. Howick
submitted an extensive legal brief. IcL After receiving the briefing on the issue, the
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Board determined that it would need a legal opinion on whether Ms. Howick's at-will
status was proper, as it was required to do by its own Procedures. Id. ffiflO, 11; see also
Procedures § III.G, attached hereto as App'x 2 ("If there is a question whether a City
employee is within the class of persons who may appeal a discharge . . . the Board shall
request an opinion from the City Attorney regarding that issue.5').
The legal opinion was initially sought from the City Attorney, but the City
Attorney determined that he had a conflict of interest because he was the person who had
terminated Ms. Howick.

Facts ^[12.

The City Attorney referred the matter to

"independent special counsel/5 who would "in no way [be] subject to the control or
direction of the city attorney,55 to render an opinion on the validity of Ms. Howick5s atwill status. Id I t 12, 13.
After examining the briefing by the parties and the issues presented, independent
counsel concluded that Ms. Howick had lawfully waived her statutory rights in becoming
an at-will employee in 1998. Based on the opinion, the Board voted unanimously that it
did not have the authority to consider the appeal of Ms. Howick. Id fl8. The Board's
determination that Ms. Howick was not entitled to an appeal and Ihat it lacked
jurisdiction over Ms. Howick's appeal constituted a final action, and Ms Howick then
appealed, again, to this Court.
This process demonstrates that the Board acted carefully and with caution in
attempting to determine whether it was empowered to hear Ms. Howick's appeal. The
Board precisely followed its own procedures, and there was nothing arbitrary, capricious,
or abusive about the process. Therefore, even if Ms. Howick is entitled to constitutional
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due process in the circumstances of this case, the above-described facts demonstrate that
she received more than adequate process.
VII.

MS. HOWICK IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES UNDER ANY
OF THE LEGAL DOCTRINES SHE ASSERTS.
Utah follows the American rule that absent exceedingly unusual circumstances,

attorney fees are recoverable only if provided for by statute or contract. Culbertson v.
Bd. of County Commr's of Salt Lake County, 2008 UT App 22, ^9, 177 P.3d 621. Ms.
Howick has asserted several equitable grounds upon which she claims she may recover
attorney fees; however, even if she were to prevail in this appeal, none of Ms. Howick's
asserted grounds justify an award of attorney fees in this case.
A-

Attorney Fees Are Not Available to Ms. Howick Under the Private
Attorney General Doctrine.

Ms. Howick first asserts that she is entitled to recover her attorney fees under the
private attorney general doctrine. Utah courts may only award attorney fees under this
doctrine when "the vindication of a strong or societally important public policy takes
place and the necessary costs in doing so transcend the individual plaintiffs pecuniary
interest to an extent requiring subsidization." Culbertson, 2008 UT App 22 at f9. Fees
are awarded under this doctrine only in "extraordinary" cases. Id.; see also Stewart v.
Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 885 P.2d 759, 784 n.9 (Utah 1994) (private attorney general
doctrine applies only in an "exceptional" and "extraordinary" case).
Ms. Howick cannot demonstrate that she meets this standard. As discussed supra,
Ms. Howick is not seeking through this litigation to vindicate a strong or societally
important public policy; rather, she is merely seeking to vindicate her own supposed right
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to a hearing and reinstatement. Ms. Howick has a large personal stake in this litigation,
which undermines her claim for fees under this doctrine. Culbertson, 2008 UT App 22 at

1fl3.
In Culbertson, the Utah Supreme Court allowed a landowner to recover fees under
this doctrine because there was collusion between a property developer and the county,
resulting in willful disregard of zoning ordinances so that both the developer and the
county could obtain economic advantage. Id. at ^[14. The county and the developer
determined that they would proceed with their development plans even though the
landowners had put them on notice that they would be harmed and that what they were
doing was illegal.

Id.

The court held that the litigation vindicated "an actual and

concrete benefit to a large number of citizens." WL at ^[16; see also Stewart, 885 P.2d at
783 (stating that application of private attorney general doctrine was appropriate in case
where ratepayers petitioned for judicial review of Public Service Commission's order and
therefore benefitted all ratepayers); Utahns for Better Dental Health, Inc. v. Davis County
Clerk, 2007 UT 97, ^[10, 175 P.3d 1036 (awarding attorney fees under the private
attorney general doctrine because "blocking from the ballot of an unconstitutional
initiative petition is an actual and concrete benefit to a large number o f citizens and
voters, especially in light of the potential costs associated with campaigns to secure or
avoid the initiative's passage").
In contrast to these cases, Ms. Howick's case does not seek to confer benefits
through this appeal on anyone but herself. She has not demonstrated any public benefit
that would be realized if she prevails—in fact, the only remedy that she can obtain
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through this appeal is a hearing before the Board on the reasons behind the termination of
her employment. Not once during the nine-year period of her at-will employment, during
which time she was receiving increased salary, did Ms. Howick ever raise concerns that
her at-will job status was contrary to or affected the public interest. Nor has Ms. Howick
demonstrated that others are unhappy with the City's employment classifications
whereby they are able to voluntarily choose to become at-will employees in exchange for
increased pay.
Ms. Howick also cannot demonstrate that the "costs incurred in this litigation
exceeded their intended goals to such an extent that subsidization is appropriate."
Culbertson, 2008 UT 22 at ^[17. Ms. Howick has a strong pecuniary interest in this
case—she is seeking reinstatement to a high-paying position and is also seeking back pay
that she asserts she is owed as a result of heralleged wrongful discharge. Ms. Howick
asserts that she has incurred legal fees in vindicating her legal rights. However, these
fees do not transcend Ms. Howick's pecuniary interest because the position to which she
seeks reinstatement is a high-paying attorney position. Subsidization is not required or
appropriate in this ^ase.
Ms. Howick describes in general terms the challenges that discharged employees
face in bringing an action against their former employers at a time when they are without
employment and without any income. Ms. Howick also asserts that u[r]aising a challenge
creates severe stress and difficulty for the employee and places at risk the employee's
ability to return to the workplace or find other employment." Br. of Appellant at 37. Ms.
Howick, however, does not describe any challenges of this sort that she, personally, has
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faced. Indeed, what Ms. Howick particularly fails to mention is that she is currently
employed at a large private law firm in Salt Lake City, and therefore these purported
concerns are not relevant to her situation.
She further states that "employees seeking to vindicate these important rights face
strong financial and personal disincentives and the City's classifications, ordinances,
policies, procedures, and contracts have previously gone without challenge. This action
will make it less likely that municipal employees, including others at the City, will be
subjected to illegal classifications by their employers or be subjected to deliberately
protracted and improper processes if they seek to vindicate their rights." Br. of Appellant
at 38. However, Ms. Howick has not cited any evidence that any other municipal
employees are dissatisfied with their voluntary at-will status or believe that they were
subjected to an illegal classification.

In sum, Ms. Howick seeks subsidization of the

legal fees she has expended to vindicate her personal pecuniary interests, but these legal
fees do not exceed her interests.

This consideration does not support an award of

attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine.
Finally, this case is not extraordinary. In Stewart, the court noted the exceptional
nature of the case because plaintiffs "successfully vindicated an important public policy
benefitting all of the ratepayers in the state. Plaintiffs, a handful of ratepayers acting
entirely on their own, took on [U.S. West Communications], the Public Service
Commission, and the Division of Public Utilities and have succeeded in having the
Commission's rate of return set aside as unlawful, a [state statute] held unconstitutional,
and the Commission's incentive plan held invalid. . . . The results achieved by the
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ratepayers will necessarily benefit all . . . ratepayers in the state of Utah especially as to
future rates . . . ." 885 P.2d at 783. Then court then noted that any award of attorney fees
under the private attorney general doctrine would take an "equally extraordinary case."
Id. at 784 n.19 (emphasis added). This case is not the "equally extraordinary case"
referred to in Stewart. Ms. Howick has done nothing in this case to vindicate anyone's
rights but her own, and she has therefore not conferred a benefit on the public generally
through this action. More likely, this action is harmful to the general public because it is
requiring Salt Lake City to expend taxpayer dollars to continue to defend against Ms.
Howick's claims.
Ms. Howick contends that this case is extraordinary because the City deliberately
chose to engage in protracted litigation by not allowing her an immediate hearing before
the Board. As explained in detail supra, the Board had my jurisdiction to hear her case
and has no jurisdiction to decide legal questions, and the City has only followed its
proper policies and procedures in this case. Ms. Howick could have filed her action in a
district court immediately after she was terminated instead of continuing to seek an
appeal before a body that she was repeatedly informed had no jurisdiction. See footnote
10, supra. If anyone is to blame for the protraction of these proceedings, it is Ms.
Howick.

An award of attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine is

absolutely unwarranted in this case.

4826-7992-78113

42

B.

The City Did Not Act in Bad Faith, Vexatiously, Wantonly, or for
Oppressive Reasons.

Ms. Howick next contends that she is entitled to attorney fees because the City
acted with bad faith, willfully and dishonestly, with some motive of self interest, and with
a desire to take unconscionable advantage. Ms. Howick's contentions in this regard
strain credulity, and although she hurls a plethora of accusations at the City, she cites no
facts to back them up. See Still Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen, 2005 UT 46, ^[13, 122
P.3d 556 (holding that a finding of bad faith must be supported by "sufficient evidence in
the record"). To the contrary, the record demonstrates that the City properly followed its
processes and procedures in processing Ms. Howick's claims and by so doing provided
her with sufficient due process.
"Bad faith" involves dishonesty and requires willful misconduct.
Planning, Inc. v. Bank of Utah, 690 P.2d 1130 (Utah 1984).

Research-

Ms. Howick cannot

demonstrate that there was any dishonesty or willfulness involved in the City's handling
of her request for an appeal. As recited supra in detail in the City's arguments that there
was no abuse of discretion and that Ms. Howick received sufficient due process, the
Board acted properly, prudently, and in accordance with its own procedures in
determining whether it was allowed to hear Ms. Howick's appeal. This argument should
be disregarded.
C.

Attorney Fees Are Not Available to Ms. Howick Under the Due Process
Provisions of the Utah Constitution.

Ms. Howick's final argument is that attorney fees are available under the due
process provisions of the Utah Constitution. In support, she cites Spackman v. Board of
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Education, which holds that article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution is self-executing,
and "self-executing constitutional provisions allow for awards of money damages" if
three elements are met 2000 UT 87, ffiflO, 19, 16 P.3d 533, 536-39. First, a plaintiff
seeking damages must demonstrate a "flagrant" violation of her constitutional rights.
Second, a plaintiff must establish that existing remedies do not redress her injuries. And
finally, a plaintiff must establish that equitable relief was or is wholly inadequate to
protect her rights or redress her injuries. Id, ^23-25.
Ms. Howick's argument that Spackman is applicable here fails for a number of
reasons. First, Spackman applies only to money damages. The case does not make any
mention of attorney fees. Ms. Howick therefore appears to assume that attorney fees may
always be_an element of money damages. This assumption is incorrect because, again,
tlie** American rule is that an award of attorney fees—unlike money damages—is
appropriate only if provided for by statute or contract. See S. Sanpitch Co. v. Pack, 765
P.2d 1279, 1282 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (setting forth American rule and few limited
exceptions where attorney fees may be recovered as damages).
Furthermore, even if attorney fees could be considered as damages, Ms. Howick
cannot meet the three elements required under Spackman.

As analyzed supra, Ms.

Howick cannot demonstrate that she had a property interest in her employment that
would provide her with any due process right, and even if such a right were found to
exist, Salt Lake City provided Ms. Howick with sufficient due process. No "flagrant"
violation of Ms. Howick's constitutional rights occurred in this case. Also, Ms. Howick
cannot demonstrate that her existing remedy—a hearing before the Board—would not
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redress her alleged injury, which is that her at-will contract was void and illegally denied
her of process upon termination. An award of attorney fees to Ms. Howick in this case is
wholly inappropriate.
VIII. THE REMEDY THAT MS. HOWICK SEEKS IN HER "STATEMENT OF
RELIEF SOUGHT" IS UNSUPPORTABLE.
Ms. Howick also asks this Court to "[r]everse the decision of the Salt Lake City
Employee Appeals Board and reinstate her to her position in the Salt Lake City
Attorney's Office because she was a City employee entitled to the protections of Utah
Code Ann. §§ 10-3-1105 and 1106, and because her due process rights have been
violated by the City and the Board." Br. of Appellant 46.

At present, no tribunal has

had the authority to examine Ms. Howick's claims on the merits, i.e., to determine
whether Ms. Howick's department head acted within his discretion in terminating her.
Moreover, no evidence from the City is in the record on this issue. Despite these obvious
issues, Ms. Howick would have this Court bypass the important step of a lower tribunal
determination on the merits and simply reinstate her to her previous position. This
argument overlooks the fact that this Court only has jurisdiction to examine the record of
the Board and determine whether there was an abuse of discretion in the Board's
determination that Ms. Howick was not entitled to an appeal. Indeed, nothing in section 1105 and -1106 permits automatic reinstatement. Those statutes provide procedures for
administrative review only. Even if Ms. Howick were entitled to an appeal, reinstatement
would only be available to her if the Board were to find in her favor. See Procedures §
V.B, attached hereto as App'x 2; Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(5)(b).
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In sum, this Court, after reviewing the administrative record, may do one of two
things: (1) either uphold the Board's decision and deny Ms. Howick an appeal, or (2)
reverse the Board's decision and order the Board to provide Ms. Howick with an appeal.
See Kelly v. Salt Lake Civil Serv. Comm'n, 2000 UT App 235, f23, 8 P.3d 1048.
Reinstatement is not a proper remedy in this appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Respondent/Appellee Salt Lake City respectfully
requests that this Court affirm the decision of the Employee Appeals Board and
determine that Ms. Howick is not entitled to an appeal before the Board.
DATED this 24th day of November, 200&f

W. MARK GAVRE /
NICOLE G. FARRfflX
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Respondents/Appellees
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Elizabeth T. Dunning
Holme Roberts & Owens
299 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2263
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10-3-1105

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur, 2d. — 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal
Corporations, Etc. § 230.

C.J.S. — 63 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations
§ 649 et seq.

10-3-1104. Library personnel — Monthly wage deductions
and matching sums — Time of inclusion.
(1) The librarians, assistants and employees of any public library may, at
the discretion of the board of directors of the library, be included within and
participate in the pension, retirement, sickness, disability and death benefit
system established under Section 10-3-1103. In the event the librarian,
assistants and employees of the municipality are included within and participate in the system, there shall be deducted from the monthly wage or salary
of the librarian, assistants and employees and paid into the system, a
percentage of their wage or salary equal to the percentage of the monthly wage
or salary of other employees of the municipality which is paid into the system.
Also there shall be paid monthly into the system from the funds of the library
a further sum equal to the total amount deducted monthly from the wage or
salary of the librarian, assistants and employees and paid into the retirement
system.
(2) Where the election by the board of directors of any library for inclusion
of its librarian, assistants and employees within the system of any municipality is subsequent to the establishment of the system, the inclusion may begin
as of the date of the establishment of the system or as of the date of the election
as shall be determined by the board of directors. If inclusion is as of the date
of the establishment of the system, there shall be paid into the system in
addition to the subsequent monthly wage deductions and matching sums, a
sum equal to the aggregate of monthly payroll deductions and matching sums
that would have accrued during the period beginning with the establishment
of the system and ending with the election had the librarian, assistants and
employees been included within the system from its establishment.
History: C. 1953,10-3-1104, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 48, § 3.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Prerequisites.
Before library employees were eligible to participate in city plan under prior law, the library
board had to take proper action consisting of at
least two separate and distinct acts: (1) Pass

necessary resolutions permitting employees to
participate; and (2) provide funds necessary for
cost of participation. Taft v. Glade, 114 Utah
435, 201 R2d 285 (1948).

10-3-1105. Municipal employees — Duration and termination of employment — Exceptions.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), each employee of a municipality
shall hold employment without limitation of time, being subject to discharge,
suspension of over two days without pay, or involuntary transfer to a position
with less remuneration only as provided in Section 10-3-1106,
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to:
395
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(a) an officer appointed by the mayor or other person or body exercising
executive power in the municipality;
(b) a member of the municipality's police department or fire department
who is a member of the classified civil service in a first or second class city
(c) a police chief of the municipality;
(d) a deputy police chief of the municipality;
(e) a fire chief of the municipality;
(f) a deputy or assistant fire chief of the municipality;
(g) a head of a municipal department;
(h) a deputy of a head of a municipal department;
(i) a superintendent;
(j) a probationary employee of the municipality;
(k) a part-time employee of the municipality; or
(1) a seasonal employee of the municipality
(3) Nothing in this section or Section 10-3-1106 may be construed to limit a
municipality's ability to define cause for an employee termination or reduction
in force.
History: C- 1953,10-3-1105, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 48, § 3; 2004, ch. 260, § 1.
Amendment Notes, — The 2004 amendment, effective May 3, 2004, rewrote the section, which had read "All appointive officers
and employees of municipalities, other than

members of the police departments, fire departments, heads of departments, and superintendents, shall hold their employment without
limitation of time, being subject to discharge or
dismissal only as hereinafter provided."

NOTES TO DECISIONS
107 Utah 437, 154 R2d 653 (1944).

ANALYSIS

Removal.

Construction.
De facto officer.
Duration of term.
Removal.
—Council to concur.
—Right to appeal.
—Who holds power.
—Without cause.
Construction.
The language "as hereinafter provided" in
this section specifically refers to the sections
that follow. Therefore, "any officer" in § 10-31106 must mean any officer not excluded in this
section. Ward v. Richfield City, 776 R2d 93
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), aff'd, 798 R2d 757 (Utah
1990).
De facto officer.
Where the person in possession of a city office
is at most only a de facto officer, he is subject to
removal at any time and is not in a position to
complain of the city council's action abolishing
office. McAllister v. Swan, 16 Utah 1, 50 R 812
(1897).
Duration of term.
City marshal's term will not in any event last
beyond the next municipal election even though
no successor be appointed. Taylor v. Gunderson,

—Council to concur.
The consent of a majority of the council is
necessary for removal of officer. State ex rel.
Breeden v. Sheets, 26 Utah 105, 72 P. 334
(1903).
Assuming that the city marshal was rightfully holding office, the attempt by the mayor to
remove him without the concurrence of the
council was wholly ineffectual. Henriod v.
Church, 52 Utah 134, 172 P. 701 (1918).
—Right to appeal.
The legislature intended specifically to exclude a chief of police, and hence "head" of a
police "department," from the appeal provisions
of § 10-3-1106. Ward v. Richfield City, 798 R2d
757 (Utah 1990).
—Who holds power.
When this section is read in connection with
former § 10-6-30 (see present § 10-3-916), it
will be seen that the same authorities who have
the power of appointment, the mayor and city
council, have the power of removal. Taylor v.
Gunderson, 107 Utah 437, 154 R2d 653 (1944).
—Without cause.
It is the legislative intent that a city marshal
in cities of the third class may be removed
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without cause. Taylor v. Gunderson, 107 Utah
437, 154 R2d 653 (1944).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C«J,S. — 63 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations
§ 618etseq.

10-3-1106. Discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer — Appeals — Board — Procedure.
(1) An employee to which Section 10-3-1105 applies may not be discharged,
suspended without pay, or involuntarily transferred to a position with less
remuneration:
(a) because of the employee's politics or religious belief; or
(b) incident to, or through changes, either in the elective officers,
governing body, or heads of departments.
(2) (a) If an employee is discharged, suspended for more than two days
without pay, or involuntarily transferred from one position to another with
less remuneration for any reason, the employee may, subject to Subsection
(2)(b), appeal the discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary
transfer to a board to be known as the appeal board, established under
Subsection (7).
(b) If the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the
employee shall exhaust the employee's rights under that grievance procedure before appealing to the board.
(3) (a) Each appeal under Subsection (2) shall be taken by filing written
notice of the appeal with the municipal recorder within ten days after:
(i) if the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the
employee receives notice of the final disposition of the municipality's
internal grievance procedure; or
(ii) if the municipality does not provide an internal grievance
procedure, the discharge, suspension, or involuntary transfer,
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an appeal under Subsection (3)(a), the municipal recorder shall forthwith refer a copy of the appeal to the appeal
board.
(ii) Upon receipt of the referral from the municipal recorder, the
appeal board shall forthwith commence its investigation, take and
receive evidence, and fully hear and determine the matter which
relates to the cause for the discharge, suspension, or transfer.
(4) An employee who is the subject of the discharge, suspension, or transfer
may:
(a) appear in person and be represented by counsel;
(b) have a public hearing;
(c) confront the witness whose testimony is to be considered; and
(d) examine the evidence to be considered by the appeal board.
(5) (a) (i) Each decision of the appeal board shall be by secret ballot, and
shall be certified to the recorder within 15 days from the date the
matter is referred to it, except as provided in Subsection (5)(a)(ii).
(ii) For good cause, the board may extend the 15-day period under
Subsection (5)(a)(i) to a maximum of 60 days, if the employee and
municipality both consent.
397
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10-3-1012.5. Appeal to district court — Scope of review.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Commission's discretion.
Cited
_,
. . , j .
..
Commissions discretion.
City civil service commission did not abuse
its discretion in upholding a police officer's
termination for conduct including an angry
interchange with a supervisor, an angry verbal

exchange with another officer, and threatening
conduct toward a suspect's son because the
officer c o u l d n o t s h o w t h a t t h e facts d i d

not

support the charges against him or that the
charges did not warrant termination. (UnpubU s h e d d e c i s i o n } G r e e r v S a l t L a k e City Civ.
S e r v Comm'n, 2007 UT App 293.
Cited in Harmon v. Ogden City Civ. Serv.
Comm'n, 2007 UT App 336, 171 P.3d 474.

PART 11
PERSONNEL RULES AND BENEFITS
10-3-1106. Discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer — Appeals — Board — Procedure.
(1) An employee to which Section 10-3-1105 applies may not be discharged,
suspended without pay, or involuntarily transferred to a position with less
remuneration:
(a) because of the employee's politics or religious belief; or
(b) incident to, or through changes, either in the elective officers,
governing body, or heads of departments.
(2) (a) If an employee is discharged, suspended for more than two days
without pay, or involuntarily transferred from one position to another with
less remuneration for any reason, the employee may, subject to Subsection
(2)(b), appeal the discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary
transfer to a board to be known as the appeal board, established under
Subsection (7).
(b) If the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the
employee shall exhaust the employee's rights under that grievance procedure before appealing to the board.
(3) (a) Each appeal under Subsection (2) shall be taken by filing written
notice of the appeal with the municipal recorder within ten days after:
(i) if the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the
employee receives notice of the final disposition of the municipality's
internal grievance procedure; or
(ii) if the municipality does not provide an internal grievance
procedure, the discharge, suspension, or involuntary transfer,
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an appeal under Subsection (3)(a), the municipal recorder shall forthwith refer a copy of the appeal to the appeal
board.
(ii) Upon receipt of the referral from the municipal recorder, the
appeal board shall forthwith commence its investigation, take and
receive evidence, and fully hear and determine the matter which
relates to the cause for the discharge, suspension, or transfer.
(4) An employee who is the subject of the discharge, suspension, or transfer
may:
(a) appear in person and be represented by counsel;
(b) have a public hearing;
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(c) confront the witness whose testimony is to be considered; and
(d) examine the evidence to be considered by the appeal board.
(5) (a) (i) Each decision of the appeal board shall be by secret ballot, and
shall be certified to the recorder within 15 days from the date the
matter is referred to it, except as provided in Subsection (5)(a)(ii).
(ii) For good cause, the board may extend the 15-day period under
Subsection (5)(a)(i) to a maximum of 60 days, if the employee and
municipality both consent,
(b) If it finds in favor of the employee, the board shall provide that the
employee shall receive:
(i) the employee's salary for the period of time during which the
employee is discharged or suspended without pay; or
(ii) any deficiency in salary for the period during which the employee was transferred to a position of less remuneration.
(6) (a) A final action or order of the appeal board may be reviewed by the
Court of Appeals by filing with that court a petition for review.
(b) Each petition under Subsection (6)(a) shall be filed within 30 days
after the issuance of the final action or order of the appeal board.
(c) The Court of Appeals' review shall be on the record of the appeal
board and for the purpose of determining if the appeal board abused its
discretion or exceeded its authority.
(7) (a) The method and manner of choosing the members of the appeal
board, the number of members, the designation of their terms of office, and
the procedure for conducting an appeal and the standard of review shall be
prescribed by the governing body of each municipality by ordinance.
(b) For a municipality operating under a form of government other than
a council-mayor form under Chapter 3b, Part 2, Council-Mayor Form of
Municipal Government, an ordinance adopted under Subsection (7)(a)
may provide that the governing body of the municipality shall serve as the
appeal board.
History: C. 1953,10-3-1106, enacted by L.
The 2008 amendment by ch. 115, effective
1977, ch. 48, § 3; 2004, ch. 260, § 2; 2008, ch. May 5, 2008, in (6Xa), substituted "reviewed
19, § 11; 2008, ch. 115, § 1.
by" for "appealed to" and substituted "petition
Amendment Notes. — The 2008 amend- for review" for "notice of appeal" and in (6)(b),
ment by ch. 19, effective May 5, 2008, substi- substituted "petition" for "notice of appeal."
tuted "Chapter 3b, Part 2, Council-Mayor Form
This section has been reconciled by the Office
of Municipal Government" for "Part 12, Op- 0 f Legislative Research and General Counsel,
tional Forms of Municipal Government Act" in
(7)(b).

10-3-1110. Exemption from state licensure by Division of
Real Estate.
In accordance with Section 61-2-3, an employee of a municipality is exempt
from licensure under Title 61, Chapter 2, Division of Real Estate:
(1) when engaging in an act on behalf of the municipality in accordance
with:
(a) this title; or
(b) Title 11, Cities, Counties, and Local Taxing Units; and
(2) if the act described in Subsection (1) is related to one or more of the
following:
(a) acquiring real property, including by eminent domain;
(b) disposing of real property;

Art. I, § 6

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C»J.S, — 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law
§ 472 et seq.; 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 5.
A.L.R, — Anticipatory relief in federal
courts against state criminal prosecutions
growing out of civil rights activities, 8
A.L.R.3d 301.
Key Numbers, — Constitutional Law <s=>
83(1), 121 to 123.

Utah Law Review. — The Mootness Question in Habeas Corpus Proceedings Where Petitioner Is Released Prior to Final Adjudication, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 265.
Habeas Corpus and the In-Service Conscientious Objector, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 328.
Post-Conviction Procedure Act: Limitation
on Habeas Corpus?, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 595.
Am, Jur. 2d, — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Corpus §§ 5 to 7.

Sec, 6. [Right to bear arms.]
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and
defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful
purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use of arms.
History: Const 1896; L. 1984 (2nd S.S.),
S.J.R. 3.
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1983, Senate

Joint Resolution No. 2, pro]30sing to amend
this section, was repealed by .Senate Joint Resolution No. 3, Laws 1984 (2nd S.S.), § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Regulation of right to bear arms.
This section gives sufficient authority for the
legislature to forbid the possession of dangerous weapons by those who aire not citizens, or
who have been convicted of crimes, or who are
addicted to drugs, or who are mentally incompetent. State v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813 (Utah
1974).

ANALYSIS

Prospective application.
Regulation of right to bear arms.
Prospective application.
The amendment to this provision by Laws
1984 (2nd S.S.), Senate Joint Resolution No. 3
is to be given prospective application only.
State v. Wacek, 703 P.2d 296 (Utah 1985).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — The Individual Right
to Bear Arms: An Illusory Public Pacifier?,
1986 Utah L. Rev. 751.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons
and Firearms § 4.
C.J.S. — 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law
§ 511; 94 C.J.S. Weapons § 2.

A.L.R. — Gun control laws, validity and
construction of, 28 A.L.R.3cl 845.
Validity of statute proscribing possession or
carrying of knife, 47 A.L.R.4th 651.
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law <s=> 82;
Weapons @=> 1, 3, 6 et seq.

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.
History: C o n s t 1896.
Cross-References. — Eminent domain generally, § 78-34-1 et seq.
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APPENDIX 2

I.
A.
1.
2.

Purpose & Background
These procedures establish the rules for:
the composition, nomination and election of the Employee Appeals Board;
the filing of appeals to the Employee Appeals Board;
3. the exercise of the Employee Appeals Board's authority, including conduct of hearings;
4. the standard of review applicable to matters heard by the Employee Appeals Board.

B. The Employee Appeals Board is created and functions under Utah Code Annotated § 10-3-1105 &
1106 of the Utah Code, as such statutes may be amended from time to time. The Board has authority to
investigate, take and receive evidence, and fully hear and determine the matter that relates to the cause
for an employee discharge, suspension without pay for more than two days (2 shifts for employees who
work shifts longer than 8 hours) or involuntary transfer from one position to another with less
remuneration.
C. The Board has no jurisdiction to review or decide any other personnel matters. The Board has no
authority to award attorney's fees or costs to either party. Additionally, the Board has no authority to
determine the City's legal liability under federal or state law.
D. Any City officer or employee to which these procedures apply may appeal a discharge, suspension
without pay for more than two days (2 shifts for employees who work shifts longer than 8 hours) or
involuntary transfer from one position to another with less remuneration, to the Employee Appeals
Board.
E.

These procedures shall apply to each employee of the City, except the following employees:
1. an officer appointed by the Mayor or the Mayor's designee;
2. a member of the police department or fire department who is a member of the classified
civil service;
3. a police chief;
4. a deputy police chief;
5. a fire chief;
6. a deputy or assistant fire chief;
7. a head of a City department;
8. a deputy of a head of a City department;
9. a superintendent;
10. a probationary employee;
11. an hourly part-time employee;
12. seasonal employee; or
13. any other at-will employee

F. The City labor relations officer in the Management Services Department is responsible for
coordinating with the applicable departments that will conduct nominations and elections for elected
Board members, coordinating with the Mayor regarding appointments to the pool of appointed Board
members, impaneling an Employee Appeals Board from the pool of appointed and elected Board
members to hear each appeal and providing staff support to the Employee Appeals Board. The City
Attorney shall train and advise the City labor relations officer in all matters relating to the Board's
authority and due process.

G. As required by Utah Code, the Employee Appeals Board must certify its decision to the City
Recorder within fifteen (15) business days after the Board receives an appeal, unless For good cause the
Board extends the fifteen (15) day period up to a maximum of 60 calendar days, with the consent of the
employee and the City. The foUowing procedures are necessary to assure the Board cam effectively
render its decision within the statutorily required time.

II.

Board Members Selection Procedures

A. The City shall establish a pool of Board members, which shall include fourteen (14) persons: 4
appointed members and 10 elected members (elected members shall consist of five 100/200 series
employees and five 300/600 series employees).
1. Appointed Board Members. The Mayor shall appoint four (4) persons to serve on the
Board. The next appointment process shall begin in sufficient time for new Board members to be
in place by October 1, 2005, The terms of appointed persons serving on the Employee Appeals
Board shall be three years and shall begin upon the date of the person's appointment. In the event
of a vacancy created by the resignation of an appointed person or by termination for cause, the
Mayor may appoint a new person to fill the remaining term of the person who resigned or was
otherwise removed from the Board.
2. Elected Board Members, The pool of elected Board members shall consist of one (1)
100/200 series employee and one (1) 300/600 series employee from each of the following
departments: (1) Department of Airports, (2) Public Services, (3) Public Utilities, (4) Community
Development, and (5) Management Services and other areas or divisions not included in the
other four departments listed.
a. Every three years the (1) Department of Airports, (2) Public Services, (3) Public
Utilities (4) Community Development and (5) Management Services (including all other
areas and divisions not enumerated above except Police and Fire) shall solicit
nominations of employees within the respective department or area and conduct elections
for the pool of elected Employee Appeals Board members. Nominations must be open
for a minimum often (10) days. Nominees must he full-time City employees.
b. At least one and no more than five (5) 100/200 series employees and at least one and
no more than five (5) 300/600 series employees from each of the respective departments
set forth above shall be included on the list of nominees on the election ballot
c. In the event more than 5 nominations are received in any department listed above for
each of the two employee groups (100/200 and 300/600), the department may conduct a
preliminary election within such department to limit the number of nominees as set forth
in paragraph 2.b, above,
d. After nominees are identified, the respective departments shall conduct elections.
The election shall be by secret ballot Each City employee or officer in each of the
departments shall be entitled to cast two votes for nominees in their own department: one
vote for a 100/200 series nominee and another vote for a 300/600 series nominee. City
employees and officers who are not in the Department of Airports, Public Services,
Community Development, Public Utilities, Police Department or Fire Department shall
be entitled to vote on nominees in Management Services. One 100/200 series nominee
and one 300/600 series nominee with the most votes from each department shall
comprise the pool of elected persons for the Employee Appeals Board. In case of a tie in
any department, the Mayor shall cast the deciding vote.

e. Elected Board members shall serve for three year terms, except for any person
who fills the remaining term of a person who has resigned or otherwise been removed
from the Board. The next nomination period shall begin in sufficient time for new Board
members to be in place by October 1,2005. Every three years thereafter, the respective

departments shall conduct elections in sufficient time for .the terms of elected Board
members to begin on October 1 of the year in which they are elected.
f. If a an elected Board member resigns or is otherwise removed from the Board, the
remaining elected Board members shall promptly meet and elect, by majority vote,
another person from the same department and employee classification series (100/200 or
300/600) as the departing Board member to fill the remaining term of the person who
resigns or is otherwise removed from the Board. Hie City labor relations officer shall
assist the Board members to develop a list of nominees.
B.

The Mayor or the Mayor's designee may remove any Board member for cause.

HI,

Appeal Filing Process

A. Any City officer or employee to whom these procedures apply may appeal a discharge,
suspension without pay for more than two (2) days (2 shifts for employees who work shifts longer than
8 hours) or an involuntary transfer from one position to another with less remuneration to the Employee
Appeals Board. All requests for appeals must be in writing, addressed to the City Recorder and filed
with the City Recorder within the time limitations contained in these procedures.
B« The notice of appeal shall be in writing and filed before the close of the tenth business day
following the employee's receipt of a written decision by the employee's department head effecting or
upholding the disciplinary action at issue. The notice of appeal must be signed by the appellant
employee, or by his or her attorney or representative.
C.
The Notice of Appeal shall be in the form or contain the information as set forth in Appendix
"A." The form is available at the City Attorney's Office, the City Human Resources office or online at
the City's website. The Notice of Appeal must (a) set forth with specificity any issue the employee
raised in the appeal before the department head and which the employee intends to raise on appeal to
the Board (the employee may not raise any issues before the Board that were not raised in the appeal
before the department head) ; (b) include copies of any documents the employee intends to introduce at
the hearing.
D. To be considered by the Employee Appeals Board, the Notice of Appeal must be filed in the
Office of the City Recorder within the time limit specified. The Board has no authority or jurisdiction to
hear an appeal that is filed beyond the time limits .specified in this procedure or filed anywhere other
than with the Office of the City Recorder.
E. The Office of the City Recorder is located in Room 415, City & County Building, 451 South State
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
F. Upon receipt of a written appeal, the City Recorder shall immediately provide a copy of the
appeal to the City labor relations officer and to the City Attorney.
G. If there is a question whether a City employee is within the class of persons who may appeal a
discharge, suspension or transfer, the Board shall request an opinion from the City Attorney regarding
that issue. Hie City Attorney shall render an opinion no later than the next business day after a request is
received.
H, Any person who voluntarily terminates his or her employment with the City may not appeal his or
her release from employment to the Employee Appeals Board.

IV,

Impaneling a Board for each Appeal

A. When an employee files an appeal, the City labor relations officer shall impeinel a Board to hear
such appealfromthe pool of Employee Appeals Board members. Each such Board shall consist of five
(5) members.
B. The City labor relations officer shall impanel members for each appeal who Jire least likely to
have personal knowledge of the cause for the appellant's discharge, suspension or transfer. The City
labor relations officer shall designate one of the Board members as the Chairperson for the subject
appeal and notify that member of his or her designation. At the same time the Board members and the •
Chairperson receive their notification, the City labor relations officer shall notify the department head of
each impaneled Board member. The notification to the respective department heads shall state that the
duties of the Board member take precedence over all other duties.
C
As soon as reasonably possible after the labor relations officer receives the appeal, the labor
relations officer shall notify the appellant, the affected City department, the Board members, and the
City Attorney of the date, time, and location the Board will hear the appeal While the labor relations
officer may consider requestsfromeither party for a particular hearing date, the avmlability of the Board
members and other requirements imposed by law will constrain the ability of the Board to accommodate
the parties.
D. Board members shall receive no additional compensation or benefits beyond their City salary or
wages for their service as Board members. However, Board members who are Fair Labor Standards Act
non-exempt employees shall be paid their regular rate of pay for time worked for their duties and such
time worked shall be considered in determining the City's overtime liability during the work weeks in
which the employee serves as a Board member.

V.

Appellant's Rights on Appeal

A. An appellant may be represented by any person of his or her choice to act as an advocate at any
level of the appeal procedure.
B. An appellant may request City employees and other persons to appear as witnesses during the
appeal proceedings and may present any relevant information in mitigation. Such witnesses and
information must relate directly to (1) the cause for the action taken, as set forth in the disciplinary
decision letter, and (2) any issues raised by either party at the proceeding before the department head.
C. An appellant may cross-examine any witnesses called by the City department during the appeal
proceedings. An appellant may inspect documents offered by the City department and may offer
evidence in explanation and rebuttal.
D. No City employee may take any reprisals against anyone who participates in an appeal proceeding
under this procedure.
E. If the Employee Appeals Board finds in favor of the employee, the next business day after the
Board's decision is certified to the City Recorder an employee who has been discharged or involuntarily
transferred to a position of less remuneration shall be restored to his or her former position. The
employee shall receive the employee's salary for the period of time during which the employee is
discharged, or suspended without pay, or any deficiency in salary for the period during which the
employee was transferred to a position of less remuneration.

VI,

Pre-hearing Procedures

A. Hie appellant employee or City department may file with the Board prior to the hearing any
relevant documents or written arguments that directly relate to (1) the cause for the discharge or transfer
as set forth in the disciplinary decision letter, and (2) any issues raised at the appeal to the department
head.. In case of such a filing, the appellant or City department shall make six copies of such documents
or written arguments for the Board and one copy for the other party to the proceeding. The six copies of
relevant documents or written arguments for the Board shall be filed with the City labor relations
officer. The party filing such documents or written arguments shall provide a copy of such documents or
written arguments to the other party to the proceeding the same day as any filing with the Boaid.
B. In each case of the filing of relevant documents or written arguments, the City labor relations
officer shall immediately distribute one copy of such materials to each impaneled Board member. The
City labor relations officer shall request that each member take any necessary work time to read and
review any materials. The City labor relations officer shall request that the department head of each
Board member authorize work time for Board members to review materials received.
C. At any time prior to the hearing, the Bo^rd Chair may meet with the parties in a pre-hearing
conference. The pre-hearing conference is intended as a mechanism to expedite the proceeding and will
not be used to stall or unnecessarily delay the hearing process. At the discretion of the Board Chair, the
pre-hearing conference may be conducted telephonically. At the conference, the Board Chair may
require the parties to submit a list of witnesses, exhibits, and documents that each party intends to offer
in evidence; submit a joint statement detailing stipulated facts not in dispute; submit a joint statement
narrowing die matters for consideration by the Board; and make other orders to facilitate an efficient
and effective hearing. The pre-hearing conference is informal and not open to the public. Submissions of
required information from the pre-hearing conference shall be to the City labor relations officer.
D. The Board has no legal authority to issue subpoenas. If a party to the proceeding requests that
certain infonnation or persons be subpoenaed, the Board shall request the Office of the City Attorney to
issue the subject subpoena. The Board has the authority to quash any subpoena issued by the City
Attorney or issued by any other office or authority regarding matters that are pending before \he Board.
E. The Board has the authority to direct the participation or attendance of any City employee in the
Board's proceedings. Any employee who fails to comply with a Board directive to participate: or attend
a Board proceeding shall be subject to discipline as determined by the employee's department head.

VH.

Hearing Procedures

A. The City labor relations officer shall employ a court reporter to record the hearing and prepare an
official transcript of the hearing. The official transcript of the hearing and all exhibits; written
arguments, and other evidence received by the Board shall be the official record of the Employee
Appeals Board proceeding.
B. Board hearings are considered open meetings under Utah law. The Board may close a hearing by
complying with the procedures and requirements of Utah Code Annotated Title 52, Chapter 4, Open and
Public Meetings.
C. Board hearings are not judicial or quasi-judicial process. They shall, ho.wever, be conducted with
appropriate formality and decorum so that the due process rights of all parties are protected and the
Board may perform its function. Utah Rules of Evidence and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are used as
guidelines in the conduct of Board hearings, but are not strictly followed or applied. The Board shall not
strictly apply rules of evidence regarding authentication, foundation, or hearsay.
D. Upon motion of either party, the Board may invoke the exclusionary rule for witnesses. However,
one department representative of the City's choice will be allowed to remain present at all times.
E. The City labor relations officer will serve as procedural advisor to the Board and will assist the
Board in maintaining order in the proceedings.
F.

Unless the Board Chair rules otherwise for good cause, the hearing should proceed as follows:
1. The Board Chair opens the hearing and asks if the parties are ready. The Board Chair may
ask that a summary of any pre-hearing proceedings or activity be placed in the record.
2. Each party makes an opening statement. The City department makes its opening statement
first.
3. The City department presents evidence. The representative of the City department asks the
witnesses questions. After the City representative has questioned each witness, the employee or
the representative for the employee is entitled to cross-examine the witness. After crossexamination, the City may ask questions relating to the subject of the cross-examination,
4. After the City department has presented its evidence, the employee or employee's
representative calls witnesses and presents evidence. After the employee or the employee's
representative has questioned each witness, the representative of the City department is entitled
to cross-examine the witness. After cross-examination, the employee or representative for the
employee may ask questions relating to the subject of the cross-examination.
5. After all witnesses and evidence have been presented, each party makes a closing statement.
Ordinarily, the City department makes its closing statement first The employee or employee
representative makes his/her statement next. The City is then entitled to make a final statement to
discuss any issues raised in the closing statement of the employee or employee's representative.

6. After the closing statements, the Board Chair thanks eveiyone and closes the; hearing so the
Board may consider the matter.
G. Following the hearing, the Board shall meet in a duly noticed, closed meeting to deliberate and
reach a decision. The ruling of the Board shall be based on a majority vote of the members. The Board
may only uphold or overturn the decision of the Department The Board may not modify the decision of
the Department. The Board shall vote by secret ballot using the following standard of review:
1. Do the facts support the need for discipline or, in the case of a non-disciplinary discharge,
the need for remedial action to be taken by the department head? In other words, was action
warranted? If the City's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its
entirety, the decision should be upheld, even though the Board may have weighed the evidence
differently had it been in the department head's position. In order to overturn a disciplinary
action, the Board must have a definite and firm conviction that the department head's decision
was clearly erroneous.
In an appeal where an employee was discharged, not for disciplinary reasons hut because the
employee was no longer able or qualified to do the job, the Board's analysis shall end with the
analysis set forth in subsection 1, above. However, in an appeal of a disciplinary action the
Board shall proceed to step 2 of the analysis, as set forth below.
2. In a disciplinary action, if the facts support the need for discipline, is the action taken
proportionate to the discipline imposed? Discipline imposed for employee misconduct is within
the discretion of the department head. Unless the Board finds the discipline imposed is so harsh
as to constitute an abuse, rather than an exercise of the department head's discretion, the decision
of the department head should be upheld.

VHI.

Board Decision

After fully hearing the matter on appeal, the Board shall certify its decision with the City Recorder
within fifteen (15) business days after receipt of the appeal For good cause, the Board may extend the
15-day period to a maximum of sixty (60) days, with the consent of the employee and the City. The
Board shall set forth findings of fact and conclusions based on such findings regarding the issues to be
decided by the Board, as sot forth above in paragraph VII. G. 1 and 2. The Board Chair may sign the
decision on behalf of the Board. The decision shall be addressed to the appellant, with copies to the head
of the City department that took the action that was appealed. The City labor relations officer will
assure that copies of the certified decision are served on the appellant and on the affected department
head.
Revised October 17,2005 (Major revision to comply with Utah Code Annotated § 10-3-1105 & 1106,
and to revise board composition and processes )
References: Utah Code Annotated § 10-3-1105 & 1106
Salt Lake City Code 2.52.130,2.24.010
Memoranda of Understanding with Employee Organizations
Grievance Procedure for 300. 600 and 700 Series Employees
Policy 3,02.04 Employee Appeals and Grievances
Notice of Appeal Before Salt Lake City Employee Appeals Board
APPENDIX A
NOTICE OF APPEAL
BEFORE
SALT LAKE CITY EMPLOYEE APPEALS BOARD

NAME OF APPLICANT:
ADDRESS OF APPLICANT:

TELEPHONE:

WORK

HOME

DEPARTMENT:
ACTION BEING APPEALED:
Brief description of action (discharge, suspension, demotion):
Date of action being appealed:
Person who took action:
APPELLANT WILL BE REPRESENTED BY:
SPECIFIC STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE RAISED ON APPEAL (attach additional pages if necessary):

WITNESSES YOU MAY HAVE TESTIFY APPEAL (attach additional pages if necessary)::
Name:
Address:
Telephone:

Name:
Address:
Telephone:
Name:
Address:
Telephone:
Page 1 o f 2
DOCUMENTS YOU INTEND TO INTRODUCE AT TOE HEAJUNG :

WHAT ACTON DO YOU WANT THE EMPLOYEE APPEALS BOARD TO TAKE:

I hereby request a hearing before the Employee Appeals Board

Signature of Appellant

Date
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SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION^
AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT DISCLAIM^?

I understand that, if 1 am appointed by the Salt Lake City Attorney to the
"Appointed Senior City Attorney" position, my employment will be at-will
and will be for no fixed length of time.
I understand that no oral or written statements (in personnel manuals,
policies, procedures, or elsewhere) or any conduct of the Mayor, City
Attorney, or other City official at any time, other than in a written contract of
employment signed by the Mayor or City Attorney, can create an express or
implied contract to the contrary.
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EDWIN P. RUTAN, II

LAW DEPARTMENT

CITY ATTORNEY

RALPH BECKER
MAYOft

July 1, 2008
Via Hand Delivery
Stan Preston, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Dear Mr. Preston:
I am writing to request that you serve as independent special counsel for the Salt Lake
City Employee Appeals Board (the "Board'3) in an appeal in which I have a conflict of interest. I
was the immediate supervisor and made the d«^inn tr>terminatethe employment of Jodi
Howick, the employee filing the^ appeal.
Please note, that if you accept this assignment, pursuant to Salt Lake City Code Section
2.08 046A(3)/you "ihalf not Be subject to the control or direction of Hie city attorney in such
matter."
Paragraph 111(G) of the Employee Appeals Board Procedures (the "Procedures") (copy
attached) provides that "If there is a question whether a City employee is within the class of
persons who may appeal a discharge, suspension, 6r transfer, the Board shall request an opinion
from the City Attorney regarding the issue/'
By letter of M y 1, 2008 (copy attached), the Chairman of the Board requested an opinion
from me "about whether the conversion of Ms. Ho wick's position to an * at-will* position was
done appropriately. The conversion of her position took place in July, 1998."
I am advising the Board today that I have a conflict of interest because I was Ms.
Howick's immediate supervisor and made the decision to terminate her employment and that I
am referring their lequest for an opinion to you,
As background, Ms. Howick was an "at-will" employee at the time her employment was
terminated. Paragiaph I(E)(13) of the Proceduies provides that the Procedures do not apply to
"at-will" employees.

451 SOUTH STATE STREET, ROOM 505, P O Box 145478 SALT LAKE CITY. UT 84114 5478
TELEPHONE 801 535 7788

FAX 801 535 7640
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Ms. Howick contends that the City did not have the legal authority under state law to
classify her as "at-will," The City contends that it did and that in any event, the Board (as
opposed to the courts) does not have jurisdiction to consider such issues of state law under
Paragraph 1(C) of the Procedures.
Copies of the memoranda submitted to the Board by counsel for the parties (W. Mark
Gavre, Esq. for the City and Elizabeth T. Dunning, Esq. for Ms. Howick) are attached.
Paragraph III(G) of the Procedures provides thatt when an opinion is requested by the
Board "The City Attorney shall render an opinion no later than the next business day after a
request is received." The Procedures do not address the situation when the City Attorney has a
conflict of interest.
In addition, Paragraph 1(G) of the Procedures provides that the Board must certify its
decision to the City Recorder within fifteen (15) business days after the Board receives an
appeal, unless for good cause shown the board extends the fifteen (15) day period up 1o a
maximum of 60 calendar days, with the consent of the employee and the City.
The Board members received a copy of the notice of appeal on June 23, 2008, which
means that the fifteen business day period runs on July 15,2008. (Ms, Dunning, if you disagree
with that calculation, please advise Mr. Porter and me.)
Because you are not familiar with the Procedures insofar as I am aware, the City will not
object to your taking a reasonable period of time to render your opinion to the Board as long as
you keep in mind the provisions of Paragraph 1(G) of the Procedures.
Please let me know as quickly as possible if you accept this assignment. Compensation
would be on the same terms as your legal work for the Civil Service Commission.
Very truly yours,

cc:

Randy Buckley
Debra Alexander
Mark Gavre, Esq.
Elizabeth Dunning, Esq.
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SNOW, CHRISTENSEN&MARTINEAU
Reed L Maitineau
A Dennis Norton
Allan L Larson
J o h n E Gates
Kim R. Wilson
Michael R. Carlston
David G Williams
MaxD Wheeler
David W Slaughter
Stanley J Preston
Shawn E Drancy
John R. Lund
Rodney R Parker
Richard A Van Wagoner
Andrew M. Morse
Camillc N Johnson
Elizabeth L Willey
E Scott Awerkamp
Dennis V Dahle
KoreyD Rasmussen
Terence L Rooney
Jill L Dunyon
David L Pinkston
Julianne Blanch
Stephen H Urquhart
Brian P Miller

Judith D Wolferts
Keith A Call
KaraL Pettit
HeatherS White
Robert R Harrison
Robert W Thompson
Scott H Martin
Joseph P Barrett
Trystan B Smith
Maralyn M Reger
Kenneth L Reich
Bradley R Blackham
D Jason Hawkins
Richard A Vazquez
Sam Harkness
David F Mull
Bryan M Scott
P Matthew Cox
DerekJ Williams
Ledani Marshall
R Scott Young
Jordan G Garn
Levi J Clegg
Murry Warhank
John S Treu

A Professional Corporation
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000
Telephone (801) 521-9000

Ihurman & Sutherland
Thurman, Sutherland & King
Ihurman, Wedgwood 8c Irvine
Irvine, Skeen o'cThurrnan
Skecn, Ihurman, Worsley & Snow
Worsley, Snow 6c Chnstensen
John H Snow 1917-1980

Facsimile (801) 363-0400
www scmlaw com

July 10,2008

OfCounsel
Harold G Chnstensen
Joseph Novak

St George Office
555 South Bluff Street, Suite 301
St George, Utah 84770
Telephone (435) 673-8288
Facsimile (435) 673-1444
To Contact Wnter

Via Hand-Delivery and First-Class Mail
Randy Buckley
Chairman, Employee Appeals Board
Salt Lake City Corporation
451 South State Street, Rm. 115
P.O. Box 145464
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-5464
Re:

Salt Lake City Employee Appeals Board's Request for Legal
Opinion in Jodi Howick Appeal

Dear Mr. 3uckley:
Due to a conflict of interest by the Salt Lake City Attorney's Office ("City Attorney's
Offir**'^ we* h?v° h^e n a c ^e^ hw Ci*w Attorney PHwin P P u ^ n TJ t<^ art ^c, it-iHprw^nd^nt ^rwial

counsel for the Salt Lake City Employee Appeals Board (the "EAB") with regard to the appeal of
Jodi Howick, as well as with regard to a July 1, 2008 "Request for Legal Opinion" by the EAB
concerning Ms. Howick's appeal. By letter to Mr. Rutan dated July 2, 2008, we agreed to accept
the offered assignment.
REQUEST FOR LEGAL OPINION
Ms. Howick, a lawyer, was employed in the City Attorney's Office until she was
terminated on August 31, 2007. The EAB has requested a legal opinion in connection with an
appeal by Ms. Howick, addressing the following issue:
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Randy Buckley
July 10,2008
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Whether the conversion of Ms. Howick's position to an "at-will"
position was done appropriately. The conversion of her position
took place in July 1998.

Ms. Ho wick's employment with Salt Lake City Corporation (the "City") began in 1992
when she assumed a position as staff attorney in the City Attorney's Office. In 1998, in
exchange for an increase in pay, Ms. Ho wick signed a document titled "Salt Lake City
Corporation At-Will Employment Disclaimer" (the "Disclaimer"). The Disclaimer states as
follows:
I understand that, if I am appointed by the Salt Lake City Attorney
to the "Appointed Senior City Attorney" position, my employment
will be at-will and will be for no fixed length of time.
I understand that no oral or written statements (in personnel
manuals, policies, procedures, or elsewhere) or any conduct of the
Mayor, City Attorney, or other City official at any time, other than
in a written contract of employment signed by the Mayor or City
Attorney, can create an express or implied contract to the contrary.
The Disclaimer is signed by Ms. Howick, and is dated July 22, 1998.
Ms Howick thereafter worked for the City Attorney's Office as an Appointed Senior City
Attorney until August 31, 2007, when she was terminated. Subsequently, when Ms. Howick filed
an appeal of her termination with the EAB, she was informed by Jamey Knighton, of the City's
Labor Relations Office, that she was not entitled to an appeal of her termination because she was
an at-will employee.
Ms. Howick then filed an appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. See Appeal No,
20070863-CA. On its own sua sponte Motion for Summary Disposition based on lack of subject
matter jurisdiction due to the absence of a final, appealable order, the Court of Appeals dismissed
Ms. Howick's appeal. In a footnote to its opinion, the Court of Appeals noted that the EBA
procedures allow it to "request an opinion from the City Attorney regarding questions of whether
an employee is within the class of persons who may appeal." Ms. Howick's appeal to the EAB
then pioceeded.
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DISCUSSION
For purposes of responding to the EAB's Request for Legal Opinion, we accept its
statement that Ms. Howick's employment position was "converted" in July 1998 to an at-will
position. This assumes that prior to July 1998,1 Ms. Howick's employment position was not atv<i.i, CJLG tiiot Stjine evci'ii rcsdlteu iii tms conversion to at-wiii employ mom. n. iVis. IIoV\ior^s
municipal employment was not at-will prior to her signing the Disclaimer, she would have had a
property interest in employment such that she could not be terminated except for cause, and she
would have had a right to the due process procedures set forth in Utah Code Ann. §10-3-1106.
This would include notice of the "cause" for discipline prior to termination, and a hearing before
the EAB i fter termination.
Based on the undisputed facts contained in the briefing submitted by Ms. Howick and the
City, the "conversion" event was the signing by Ms. Howick of the Disclaimer, the language of
which is quoted above. As Ms. Howick states in her brief to the EAB:
In July, 1998, the [City] Attorney's Office claimed to create a new
"at-will" position outside of the merit employment system. Staff
attorneys were asked to agree to move to the newly-created
position in exchange for a raise in pay. Ms. Howick moved to this
position and signed a document titled "Disclaimer" in connection
with this move.

'The version of Utah Code Ann. §10-3-1105 in effect in 1998 stated as follows:
Appointive officers and employees—Duration and termination
of term of office.
All appointive officers and employees of
municipalities, other than members of the police
departments, fire departments, heads of
departments, and superintendents, shall hold their
employment without limitation of time, being
subject to discharge or dismissal only as hereinafter
provided.
The langyage of §10-3-1105 was changed in 2004, and the 2004 version remains in effect today.

Randy Buckley
July 10, 2008
Page 4

See Ho wick's Mem. Supp. Juris. & Rt. to Appeal, p. 1 (copy of Disclaimer attached as Ex. A to
Brf.). There is no allegation by Ms. Howick that her signing the Disclaimer was anything other
than voluntary on her part and in exchange for an increase in pay, which she subsequently
received.
Based on the foregoing, the fundamental issue involved in the EAB's question is whether
Ms. Howick, who once had a property interest in employment under Utah Code Ann. §10-3-1105
with attendant rights to due process under Utah Code Ann. §10-3-1106, could agree to waive
those statutory rights and become an "at-will" employee. The question also involves whether the
City could ask Ms. Howick to agree to waive those statutory rights. For the reasons set forth
below, we conclude that Ms. Howick could waive the referenced statutory rights under
§§10-3-1105 and 1106, that the City was not prohibited from making that request, and that the
"conversion" of Ms. Howick's employment to at-will status in 1998 was, therefore, a binding
agreement within the legal prerogatives of the parties.
Ms. Howick contends that under Utah law, specifically Utah Code Ann. §10-3-1105, the
Legislature has designated which employment positions are at will, that "Ms. Howick's position
is not on that list," and that the City therefore violated its legal authority as well as state law
when it "classified" and "treated her" as an at-will employee. She contends this makes any
action by the City "void and without effect" from the beginning. However, Ms. Howick's
argument focuses only on the state statute itself and ignores that she voluntarily signed the
Disclaimer.
Case law recognizes that statutory rights are not necessarily fixed. Even a government
employee who did not have a statutory property interest might be found to have a property
interest (with due process rights) through other means, such as an independent agreement with
the municipality. For example, in Palmer v. City ofMonticello, 731 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Utah
1990), the court found that even though police officers were excluded from the purview of § 103-1105, nothing in §10-3-1105 would "prevent police officers from negotiating separate
employment contracts, or cities from giving police officers further rights in their employment"
which would give them due process rights. See id at 1507. Courts also recognize that additional
rights can be created by implied contract. The Utah Supreme Court acknowledged in Buckner v
Kennard, 2004 UT 78, 99 P.3d 842, that although the terms of employment for public employees
are generally set by statute and not by contract, "there may be circumstances in which the
government voluntarily undertakes an additional duty that it would otherwise have no obligation
to perform, in which case an implied contract arises imposing that duty" as long as the duty is not
inconsistent with the underlying statute. See id, f 32.

«'=;
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If an implied or express contract can expand due process rights for a municipal employee
who does not have a statutory property interest and attendant due process rights, it would then
follow that Ms. Howick may voluntarily agree to waive any statutory property interest and due
process rights to which she might otherwise be entitled.
In fact, government employees with rights under §10-3-1105 and §10-3-1106 routinely
enter into settlement agreements with municipalities in which the employee agrees to waive
statutory due process and other statutory rights in exchange for monies or other consideration.
These agreements, generally initiated by the municipality, are not improper or illegal even though
their effect sometimes is to "convert" an employee to an at-will status.
Numerous cases also recognize that constitutional due process rights can be waived by
agreement or by failure to assert them. For example, in Legg v. Board of Pardons, 2007 UT
App. 190, 2007 WL 1576394, the court held that by signing a "Time Waiver for Parole
Revocation Hearing," a prisoner "waived any claim that he was denied procedural due process
when the Board failed to hold parole and revocation proceedings immediately after his return to
custody." 2007 WL 1576394 at* 1. Likewise, in Kirkland v St Vrain Valley School District
No RE-IJ, 464 F.3d 1182 (10th Cir. 2006), the court recognized that a government employee
with due process rights can waive those by failing to pursue them. Id. at 1195; accord, Tenorio
v. Sandoval County Bd of Commissioners, 77 F.3d 493, 1996 WL 77039, *2 (10th Cir.).
It .,lso is significant that nothing in Part 11 of the Utah Municipal Code (which deals with
Personnel Rules and Benefits) prohibits the kind of agreement entered into here between Ms.
Howick and the City. By contrast, the Employment Security Act and the Workers Compensation
Act, botii of wliich deai with workers* rights, expressly prohibit an agreement by an employee to
waive rights or compensation obtainable under those Acts. Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-108(1)
(employee may not agree to waive rights to workers compensation); id. §34A-4-103(l)(aj ("any
agreement by an individual to waive, release, or commute his rights to benefits or any other
rights under this chapter [unemployment] is void"). If the legislature had intended that a
municipal employee could not waive his or her statutory rights under § 10-3-1105 and §10-31106, the legislature could have so specified, and it did not.

Randy Buckley
July 10, 2008
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CONCLUSION
This legal opinion is restricted solely to Ms. Howick's situation. No opinion is expressed
as to the legality or appropriateness of any City policy or procedure since it is not necessary to
address them in arriving at the conclusion reached herein.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the "conversion" of Ms. Howick's position to
an at-will position in July 1998 was effected in accordemce with the lawful prerogatives of the
parties. Ms. Howick, a lawyer, voluntarily signed the Disclaimer wherein she agreed to be an atwill Senior Staff Attorney in exchange for an increase in pay. She remained in that position for
ten years until her termination in 2007. There is nothing in Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105,
§10-3-1106, or in any other law, which prohibits a municipality's requesting, and an individual's
waiving, statutory due process rights by voluntarily agreeing to become an at-will employee
pursuant to an agreement supported by consideration.
Very truly yours,
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

SJP:kd
cc: Judith D. Wolferts, Esq

dms /SLC EAB / 899633vJ / 23738/1
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RALPH BECKER

DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES

MAYOR

DIVISION OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

July 15,2008
Elizabeth Dunning
Holme Roberts & Owen, L.L.P.
299 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

RECORDED
JUL j 5 2Q08

CITY RECORDER
L

Re: Decision - Jodi Ho wick Appeal
Dear Ms. Dunning,
As outlined in Salt Lake City Corporation Policy and Procedure, the Employee Appeals
Board (EAB) met on July 15, 2008. At the meeting, the EAB considered the question of
it's authority to review the appeal of Jodi Ho wick.
The EAB reviewed documentation submitted on behalf of Ms. Ho wick and for Salt Lake
City Corporation. The EAB also reviewed documentation submitted by Stan Preston,
who had been asked to provide an independent legal opinion regarding the conversion of
Ms. Ho wick's position to an "at-will" position.
Having reviewed the documentation, and having deliberated in closed session, the EAB
voted unanimously that it did not have the authority to review the appeal of Ms. Ho wick.
The EAB considered the following facts in making their decision:
1. Ms. Ho wick was an "at-will" employee at the time of her termination.
2. The conversion of Ms. Ho wick's position to an "at-will" position was done
appropriately.
3. Salt Lake City Policy and Procedure - 3.02.04 specifies that the appeal process does
not apply to "at-will" employees.
In accordance with policy, the Board's decision will be certified with City Recorder's
Office.

Randy Buckley
Chairman, Employee Appeals Board
Cc:

Mark Gavre, Esq.
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